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Dissertation supervised by Dr. Russ Walsh 
 This dissertation uses autoethnography and critical psychological and 
philosophical theories to explore what people with Alzheimer’s disease teach us about 
being, forgetting, and dying in the Anthropocene. The author collected personal memory 
data from her lived experience of being with her mother while she had Alzheimer’s 
disease, and organized these memories into a series of vignettes. Each vignette was 
analyzed with critical psychological and philosophical theories to illuminate 
intersubjective themes of denial, things, ancestors, place, dying, and time. These themes 
connected the personal to the epochal and articulated the wisdom that our most forgetful 
elders can share in the Anthropocene, an era that reproduces itself around the fulcrum of 
forgetfulness about the interdependence of humans with the rest of the biosphere. A 
number of themes emerged which were elaborated in the form of wisdom being passed 
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down from our most forgetful elders, including: denial is part of the journey, and needs to 
be worked through; listen for the animacy of things and other beings; you can call upon 
your ancestors for support and guidance; did you know that you can time travel?; agency 
in death is difficult to discern; be a steward of chronic grief; and care is political. It was 
found that our most forgetful elders remind us of our interdependence and show us ways 
of resisting capitalist and colonial ontological pressures, which in turn can help us 
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Memory is a strange bird 
doling out the world in  
 
shards –  
the stuff we are made of. 
 
I am the keeper, now, 
I hold them all. 
 
Tonight as I write I become conjurer –  
 
when I open my hands:  
a thousand sparrows 
 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
This study investigates sharing a lifeworld with my Mom1 while she had Alzheimer’s 
disease, within the sociohistorical context of the Anthropocene. My interest in the topic of this 
study arose from my experience relating to my Mom while she lived with Alzheimer’s disease, 
and my dissertation is an ode to her in many languages–personal, psychological, and 
philosophical. It is an ode to the persistence and evolution of our connection and how we both 
related to broader cultural systems as she transformed with the progression of the disease. As her 
ways of being in the world morphed through the course of her illness, she shed light on what it 
means to be a person living through the Anthropocene. Her shifting subjectivity revealed wisdom 
about being, forgetting and dying in this present epoch, gifts of wisdom that provided a unique 
perspective on the mutually-reinforcing reproduction of subjectivity and collective historical 
lifeworld. This dissertation aims to articulate these gifts through a series of stories based on my 
memories of being with her through the course of her disease, alongside explorations of critical 
psychological and philosophical theory which seek to elaborate on the broader implications of 
these stories. 
My Mom, Linda Heller, progressed from having Mild to Major Neurocognitive Disorder 
due to Alzheimer’s disease over a period of 6 years, and she died from the disease in April of 
2019. As her daughter, I strained to stay in contact with her spirit, something that required a 
steady stream of acknowledging and grieving the small but persistent and accumulating changes 
                                                   
1 I use the term “Mom” rather than “Mother” because this project prioritizes intimacy over so-called 






and losses, and celebrating our new forms of relating and co-existing along the way. As 
Alzheimer’s disease morphed our shared lifeworld, she became foreign to my recollection of her, 
the threads of her memory unwinding from our shared world and weaving another way of being 
in the world.  
This dissertation is an autoethnography, exploring my embodied relational connection to 
my Mom in the context of our cultural situatedness. Autoethnography is a qualitative research 
method that explores personal experience in relation to wider cultural, political and historical 
meanings and phenomena, and offers an evocative, embodied perspective from which to describe 
and critique the wider cultural dynamics. I draw upon existential phenomenological methods of 
interpretation to explore how my Mom and others with Alzheimer’s disease may experience their 
lifeworld transforming, attending to themes like dwelling in a place, being in time, relating to 
things, and to other beings, human and other-than-human. My primary research question focuses 
on what people with Alzheimer’s disease can teach us about being, forgetting, and dying in the 
Anthropocene, an era of deep, collective forgetfulness about our interconnectedness with human 
and non-human beings. I weave this all together using a distinctive method of autoethnographic 
research by using a series of personal recollections about my relationship with my Mom, 
followed by theoretical explorations of those stories, a method I will describe more in depth in 
the method section below.  
Why situate my project in the Anthropocene? The Anthropocene is perhaps the largest 
scale systemic structure under which our daily lives are organized on a global level. The concept 
of the Anthropocene, which will be more thoroughly defined later in this introduction, articulates 
that humankind is the most powerful force shaping the vast ecosystems across our planet for the 






capitalism and colonialism, that shape most contemporary cultures. Importantly, its influence 
structures subjectivity in ways that will be explored throughout this dissertation. I chose to frame 
this dissertation within the context of the Anthropocene because it frames and drives the most 
significant existential threat that humankind has ever faced, as we continue to shape the planet in 
ways that make it ever more inhospitable to our own survival. The Anthropocene reproduces 
itself out of a dynamic of a seeming forgetfulness about our interdependence, and instead  
supports domination and objectification as primary relational structures. Despite longstanding 
observations about the negative impact of human domination of the biosphere that have been 
practiced over the last half millennium, modern life is organized by “systems of governance that 
generate structural forgetfulness about injustice, destruction and despair” (Collie, 2019). This 
dissertation asks what our most forgetful elders might teach us about forgetting, being, and dying 
– important themes to investigate in understanding how and why we continue to perpetuate the 
Anthropocene, and how we might survive it.  
The topic is challenging to study for many reasons. It can be difficult for people with 
Alzheimer’s disease to describe their experience such that someone else can understand, 
especially because aphasia (difficulty speaking) is a common symptom of Alzheimer’s. I am 
therefore vigilant in trying not to speak for, or over, the personal narratives of people living with 
Alzheimer’s disease. Because I am not living with Alzheimer’s disease myself, I am sensitive to 
the ways I might be able to approach some understanding without presuming I’ve got it right. 
My methods of exploration therefore privilege this conundrum, by situating my research 
autoethnographically—that is, based in my experience of relating to my Mom while she had 
Alzheimer’s. Another challenge of this project is catching sight of how the Anthropocene, the 






can be hard to articulate in daily life because it is the water we are all swimming in. Furthermore, 
distinguishing characteristics of the Anthropocene from characteristics of other large systems 
such as capitalism, or United States culture, is not always clear or even possible. This project is 
therefore a way of thinking into the forgetfulness of the epoch, pushing at the edges of my own 
understanding. 
Because this project is based in my experience with my Mom, it is important that my 
readers know a few things about me and my social identities. The experience I had with my 
Mom while she had Alzheimer’s disease is not intended to be representative of others’ 
experiences, and my cultural situatedness and role in caring for my Mom are important 
contextual factors. My situatedness is important for readers to keep in mind, because I 
undoubtedly hold biases and have blind spots due in part to how I was socialized. I am a 33-year-
old, white, queer, able-bodied, cisgender woman, and I grew up with considerable class privilege 
that has, along with my whiteness, been a major factor in my being able to access an abundance 
of educational opportunities, including my current pursuit toward a PhD in clinical psychology. I 
grew up in urban centers in the Pacific Northwest, mostly in Seattle. My Mom was a white, 
heterosexual cisgender woman born in 1946 who grew up in a small fishing town in Alaska and 
lived most of her adult life in Seattle. She experienced upward class mobility and was able-
bodied for most of her life. My Mom and Dad remained married until her death in 2019, and my 
Dad was her primary caregiver during the many years she had Alzheimer’s disease.  
My Dad saw a different side to my Mom’s experience of Alzheimer’s: the daily 
caregiving side, which was undoubtedly more challenging and exhausting, and probably a great 
deal less romantic than the perspectives I share in this project. If there is an unsung hero in this 






core to his identity for a number of years. He did right by her throughout an impossible time in 
our family. I describe myself and my older brother as secondary caregivers, because we were 
both living in different states from our parents during the time my Mom had Alzheimer’s. As a 
result, we were only occasionally involved in the daily care for my Mom whenever we could 
visit, every few months. Despite the distance, being with my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s 
disease was primary in my experience for the years during which she had it. Navigating graduate 
school at the same time was a difficult season in my life, and part of how I made space for my 
grief amidst the grueling workload of a PhD program was by using the space of my studies and 
research to engage with it. This project is therefore the culmination of many years of exploration.  
Through this project, I hope to contribute a more robust understanding of being in 
relation to loved ones who have Alzheimer’s disease, to offer language to the experiences of 
intersubjectivity that can deeply alter our own perception of what it means to navigate death and 
life in the Anthropocene, and more specifically within a Western neoliberal cultural context in 
the United States. I anticipate that my project has the potential to impact various perspectives 
from practical to philosophical. Practically, I hope that my project will influence how we care for 
our most forgetful elders by illuminating the definitions of selfhood that motivate our styles of 
caregiving and understandings of interdependence in the Anthropocene and the Western colonial 
and capitalist structures that have shaped our practices of care. Philosophically, I aim to 
contribute to our understandings of intersubjectivity and selfhood, and the ways in which 
memory can reinforce or challenge dominant structures of subjectivity under the conditions of 
the Anthropocene. Personally, this dissertation has been one of the ways I continued to stay in 
relation to my Mom after her death, and I attempt to remain faithful to my lived experience as a 






Literature Review  
This section reviews the literature on the biomedical perspective of Alzheimer’s, and why 
the biomedical perspective is insufficient in gaining a thorough understanding of the lived 
experience of Alzheimer’s disease. Different explanatory models of Alzheimer’s disease affect 
not only the experience of those living with the disease, but also how we support people and their 
families through different therapeutic modalities, from pharmaceuticals to nursing homes to 
public funding for research to psychotherapy, right down to how we simply have conversations 
with people who have Alzheimer’s. They also influence how we relate to our loved ones who 
have Alzheimer’s disease. 
I will review experience-near accounts of Alzheimer’s disease that exist in the literature 
and examine what gaps there are in that body of knowledge. The purpose of this literature review 
is to demonstrate that an autoethnographic, critical phenomenological study on loving somebody 
with Alzheimer’s disease can contribute important knowledge to various dimensions of the lives 
of people who have Alzheimer’s disease and the people who love them, as well as to overarching 
understandings of being in the world during the time of the Anthropocene. 
Biomedical Discourse on Alzheimer’s Disease 
In this section, I will review important literature on biomedical perspectives of 
Alzheimer’s disease, pointing to limitations of this model and the effects of those limitations on 
people with Alzheimer’s disease. Models of disease are theoretical models that are used as a kind 
of roadmap to diagnosis and treatment. They conceptualize disease and health based on a number 
of theoretical assumptions. In the last century, the biomedical model became the predominant 
model of Western medicine. An excellent working definition for the biomedical model of 






model and advocate for a less reductive approach to medicine. He wrote that the biomedical 
model of disease:  
…Assumes disease to be fully accounted for by deviations from the norm of 
measurable biological (somatic) variables. It leaves no room within its framework 
for the social, psychological, and behavioral dimensions of illness. The 
biomedical model not only requires that disease be dealt with as an entity 
independent to social behavior, it also demands that behavioral aberrations be 
explained on the basis of disordered somatic (biochemical or neurophysiological) 
processes. (Engel, 1977, p. 130) 
Engle wrote his critiques in the 1970s, and advocated instead for a biopsychosocial model 
of medicine, which incorporates social and psychological factors alongside physiological 
understandings and treatments of disease. The biopsychosocial model has gained acceptance as 
an improved model of disease in the decades since, however it has also gained criticism, 
particularly about the difficulty doctors have in actually applying such an integrated model of 
medicine (Farre & Rapley, 2017). As a result, what is practiced today in Western medicine may 
be more of a “split model,” in which the psychosocial factors of disease are used as an optional 
add-on to the still prioritized physiological factors (Herman, 2005). In my discussion of the 
biomedical model that proceeds from here, I will use the term biomedical to mean this “split 
model” approach, where the physiological explanations and treatments are the predominant way 
of understanding disease, with some psychosocial dimensions as secondary factors, as this 
typifies the current biomedical approach.  
The biomedical perspective is not only dominant in fields where we might expect 






psychology and psychiatry have also been profoundly impacted by this model over the last 
century. Even the former American Psychiatric Association (APA) president and current chair of 
the DSM steering committee, Paul Applebaum, noted in 2003 that, “our brains are biological 
organs by their very nature. Any [mental] disorder is in its essence a biological process.” 
(Deacon, 2013, p. 848). Brett Deacon explains that the “core tenets of this approach include: (a) 
mental disorders are caused by biological abnormalities principally located in the brain, (b) there 
is no meaningful distinction between mental diseases and physical diseases, and (c) biological 
treatment is emphasized” (2013, p. 847). 
Alzheimer’s disease, a neurocognitive disorder, falls under the shared disciplines of 
psychology and neuroscience. Alzheimer’s disease is typically understood in biomedical 
discourse as a progressive and pathologically degenerative neurological disease that causes 
neurofibrillary tangles and b-amyloid plaques in the brain (D. H. Davis, 2004, p. 369). It has 
been hypothesized that the plaques and tangles cause the neurons to die, and thus create the 
progressive memory dysfunction, aphasia (difficulty speaking and understanding words), apraxia 
(difficulty performing skilled movements), hallucinations, and delusions typical of the disease 
(Sabat, 2018, p. 18). Although there is a correlation between the presence of plaques and tangles 
in the brain and Alzheimer’s Disease, no correlation has been found between the quantity of 
plaques and tangles found in a brain and the degree of cognitive impairment demonstrated in 
people with Alzheimer’s Disease (Sabat, 2018, p. 21). More recent biomedical research suggests 
that a loss of synapses is a better brain correlate of cognitive decline than the number of amyloid 
plaques or neurofibrillary tangles (Willén, Sroka, Takahashi, & Gouras, 2017). Additionally, 
new biomedical research suggests that the immune system is deeply involved in the etiology and 






and aggregated proteins bind to pattern recognition receptors on micro- and astroglia and trigger 
an innate immune response, characterized by the release of inflammatory mediators, which 
contribute to disease progression and severity” (Heneka et al., 2015, p. 2). The discovery of 
immune system involvement in pathogenesis has led to research showing that inflammatory 
factors such as diet, intoxicants such as alcohol, and exposure to certain toxic environmental 
chemicals are likely involved in the progression of the disease.  
Although Alzheimer’s disease was virtually unknown to the public 40 years ago, it now 
attracts significant attention from scientific and public communities (Selkoe & Hardy, 2016). In 
2006, the worldwide prevalence of people diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease was 26.6 million 
people (Brookmeyer, Johnson, Ziegler-Graham, & Arrighi, 2007). It is estimated that by 2050, 
the prevalence will quadruple, resulting in 1 in 85 people worldwide living with the disease 
(Brookmeyer et al., 2007). This is primarily a result of increasing average lifespans globally, as 
age is the most significant risk factor correlated with the onset of Alzheimer’s disease. Indeed, 
the United Nations Population Division projects that the number of people at least 80 years of 
age will increase by a factor of about 3.7 by the year 2050 (Brookmeyer et al., 2007, p. 190). The 
scope of how many people worldwide are impacted by the disease has motivated biomedical 
interventions that can prevent or slow the progression of Alzheimer’s disease, as well as lay 
advocacy groups who emphasize the importance of non-curative care that will help better 
support people with Alzheimer’s disease and their caregivers to access a high quality of life. 
The biomedical approach to treating the disease is focused on producing pharmacological 
and cognitive interventions that aim at preventing, reversing, or slowing the progression of the 
disease, particularly its impact on cognitive abilities. Secondarily, it attempts to find ways of 






benefitting from the management of symptoms—the person with Alzheimer’s or the people 
tasked with caring for them—is up for debate. The journal Current Treatment Options in 
Psychiatry recently published an article describing how the behavioral and psychological 
symptoms of dementia2 “include a diverse group of psychological reactions, psychiatric 
symptoms, and behaviors that are unsafe, disruptive, and impair the care of individuals with 
dementia in a given environment” (Tampi, Tampi, & Balachandran, 2017, p. 56). Whose safety 
is at risk, and what metrics of safety are they implying? What exactly gets disrupted? What 
would un-impaired care look like, and who would it benefit? While biomedical perspectives 
attempt to generate biomedical interventions, such as pharmaceutical interventions that may 
prevent or delay the progression of Alzheimer’s disease, they offer a limited perspective on the 
lived experience of Alzheimer’s disease, and prioritize interventions that extend the lifespan, 
preserve cognitive functioning, and reduce the cost of services above quality-of-life concerns 
such as emotional and relational wellbeing. Operating from the foundational perspective of 
comparing disease state to the norm, there will always be an implicit favoring and superiority of 
the norm. Furthermore, these interventions are operating within a capitalist model of healthcare 
where profit is prioritized. The lack of attention to emotional and relational wellbeing is not an 
insignificant factor in the quality and duration of life for people living with Alzheimer’s disease.  
It is no accident that biomedical interventions prioritize curative treatments over ongoing care 
                                                   
2 “Dementia” is a generic term referring to cognitive decline that impacts normal functioning, however it 
does not refer to a specific disease. The term is sometimes used as an umbrella term to describe numerous specific 
diseases defined by cognitive decline. Alzheimer’s disease is a specific neurological disease which accounts for the 






that focuses on enhancing quality of life.  
Alois Alzheimer first described the disease in 1907 as an “unusual illness of the cerebral 
cortex” (Stelzmann, Norman Schnitzlein, & Reed Murtagh, 1995). While “senile dementia” was 
the term used at the time to describe a normal phenomenon of cognitive decline in older adults, 
Alois Alzheimer’s description of a previously unclassified disease was used to describe cognitive 
decline in individuals in their 40s or 50s, what we would now describe as early-onset 
Alzheimer’s disease. Doctors in the early 1900s “used the words senile dementia and senility 
interchangeably to describe mental deterioration in old age, physicians rarely distinguished 
between simple forgetfulness and its more malignant form” (Holstein, 2000, p. 162).  Patrick Fox 
described how Alzheimer’s disease “emerged from an obscure, rarely applied medical diagnosis 
to its characterization as the fourth or fifth leading cause of death in the United States in little 
more than 12 years” (1989, p. 58). This began in the mid-1970s with the publication of Robert 
Katzman’s argument that “senile dementia” be recategorized as Alzheimer’s disease and 
included on the list of possible causes of death (1976). A major impact of this diagnostic shift in 
the 1970s was the pathologization of what was up to that point considered a normal part of aging.  
Along with an increasing average life expectancy, this medical recategorization took 
place following a surge in cultural trust in biomedical interventions as the way to cope with 
medical and social issues, which was galvanized following World War II due to medical 
advances such as the polio vaccine. This confluence positioned a biomedical approach to treating 
Alzheimer’s disease as the most sought-after. As advocacy for research into the disease grew, so 
did the ‘small government’ ideology of the 1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan: the fiscal 
restraint of the time meant that “policy approaches promising a ‘cure’ were likely to prevail over 






social conditions was that a biomedical approach to defining and treating Alzheimer’s disease 
became unquestioned, and the assumptions about selfhood underlying the biomedical approach 
to treatment seeped into the broader cultural discourse about how we understand the subjectivity 
of people living with Alzheimer’s disease, contributing to narratives that equate loss of cognitive 
function with loss of selfhood.  
The Issue of Selfhood 
Biomedical discourses about Alzheimer’s disease tend to utilize an implicit definition of 
the self that is based primarily upon identification with cognition and brain tissue. They foster a 
totalizing perspective; the person with Alzheimer’s disease becomes the “Alzheimer-ed subject” 
(Hinton IV, 2011), their self-hood collapsed into disease-hood, indeed even into zombie-hood, a 
metaphor found in scholarly and popular literature about people with Alzheimer’s disease, which 
describe them as the “living dead,” “ghouls,” and “animated corpses” (Behuniak, 2011). This 
dehumanizing and limiting outcome of the biomedical model of understanding Alzheimer’s 
disease implores us to imagine how else we can take up the disease in a meaningful way, 
especially in a way that recognizes the preserved and enduring humanity of people living with 
the disease.  
The “issue of selfhood” – that is, whether people with Alzheimer’s have a “self” that 
persists throughout the disease, or whether it is precisely the “self” that dies slowly and perhaps 
completely before the person physically dies – is hotly contested in the literature (see for 
example: Davis, 2004; Kontos, 2012; Millet, 2011). Social scientists from social interactionist 
perspective have challenged the notion of the death of the self which precedes the death of the 
body in people with Alzheimer’s, especially regarding how the self is constituted interpersonally. 






disease, you see that “cultural definitions, care settings, and caregiving relationships […] damage 
care recipients’ fragile self-esteem, leading ultimately to the loss of selfhood that is so widely 
thought to be caused by neuropathology alone” (Kontos, 2012, p. 2). From this perspective, the 
social field creates a significant loss of self, because of the unethical way in which people with 
Alzheimer’s disease are treated: as totalized beings who do not exceed the schema of 
Alzheimer’s.  
Our “hypercognitive” culture tends to “exclude the deeply forgetful by reducing their 
moral status or by neglecting the emotional, relational, aesthetic, and spiritual aspects of well-
being that are open to them, even in the advanced stage of the disease.” (Post, 1998, as quoted in 
Sabat, 2001, p. 320). This hypercognitive culture simply means that our society is one in which 
“the image of human fulfillment is framed by cognition and productivity” (Post, 2000, p. 34).  
This moral devaluation of people with Alzheimer’s disease based on their declining cognitive 
capacities is reinforced by the practices of clinical psychology and neuropsychology, which 
diagnose Alzheimer’s disease using tests which measure only a person’s cognitive capacities, 
categorically labelling the person with Alzheimer’s based solely on their cognitive deficits. 
There is no measure of so-called implicit memory, or of emotional memory in these tests. No 
measure of joy. No measure of resilience. The debate about selfhood in people with Alzheimer’s 
is slanted, and theories that people with Alzheimer’s have lost a “self” should be rejected 
because they fail to take into account the capacities which remain intact, as well as the new ways 
of being in the world which may include new strengths. Indeed, the idea that the “self” dies in 
people with Alzheimer’s before their body dies is based on a definition of selfhood that is based 
primarily upon activities of cognition. The consistency of the sense of self in time and place is 






people with Alzheimer’s to think of themselves as existing in different moments in their life 
history, for example waking in the middle of the night to get ready to go to school. The 
inconsistency in locating oneself in a particular time and place creates a fluidity of subjectivity, 
which challenges our culture’s notion that subjectivity is relatively static during each 
developmental period in a person’s life.   
Although it is undeniable that people with Alzheimer’s disease continue to have a self, I 
agree with Daniel Davis that taken to the extreme, this insistence can signify an “unimpeachable 
personhood, which sanitizes the dying process.” (2004, p. 377). This is to say, that there are real 
losses and changes in what constitutes the self over the course of the disease. Denying those 
changes and losses may unintentionally cause ambiguous and anticipatory grief of people with 
Alzheimer’s disease and their loved ones to go unrecognized and unsupported.  
Humanistic and Anthropological Perspectives of Alzheimer’s Disease  
While the biomedical discourse on Alzheimer’s disease can richly describe some of the 
physiological phenomena, especially the progression of neurological change, it falls short in 
describing the lived experience of Alzheimer’s disease, and inadvertently perpetuates 
dehumanizing discourses about the loss of self. Plaques and tangles do not explain the 
phenomena of how people actually continue to live their lives with Alzheimer’s disease. 
Centering the lived experience of the person rather than the biomedical markers of the disease 
will answer different questions and provide different insights than the biomedical model can 
accommodate.  
Fortunately, other perspectives of Alzheimer’s disease have been written about over the 
last several decades, largely in response to the dehumanizing nature of biomedical discourses. 






describe “the perception of deleterious behavioral change in someone understood to be old, with 
attention to both the biology and the institutional milieu in which such change is marked, 
measured, researched, and treated” (L. Cohen, 2006). Senility was depicted in the late nineteenth 
century as a state that threatened middle-class masculinity within an industrial age. Jessie 
Ballenger detailed how medical descriptions of senility near the turn of the twentieth century 
depicted stereotypes of the senile as “a miser, tyrant, fool, and dirty old man” (Ballenger, 2006). 
Ballenger noted that while the specificity of biomedical discourses on senility, and later the more 
specific designation of Alzheimer’s disease, has changed over time, the stigma of the disease has 
persisted as the behavior of people with Alzheimer’s continues to be depicted as “loathsome 
violations of propriety” to images of a “discredited self that was lost to the disease” (Ballenger, 
2006, p. 115). 
Tom Kitwood, a leading figure in person-centered, humanistic understandings of 
dementia, argued that dementia does not necessarily entail a radical disintegration of the person 
(1997). Kitwood posited that the experience of disease in dementia is not merely a neurological 
phenomenon, but that what happens neurologically in a person with dementia is always already 
intertwined with the person’s social environment. He described a “malignant social psychology” 
whereby the personhood of someone with dementia is undermined by their social context, 
particularly in caregiving environments where techniques of disempowerment, infantilization, 
intimidation, invalidation, accusation, and other dehumanizing behaviors are used to control the 
person with dementia (Kitwood, 1997). Kitwood characterized the “dialectics of dementia” as a 
spiraling interactive process, where neurological impairment and malignant social psychology 







Stephen Post explained the problems of a “hypercognitive culture,” which he described 
as the cause of our society’s tendency to “exclude the deeply forgetful by reducing their moral 
status or by neglecting the emotional, relational, aesthetic, and spiritual aspects of well-being that 
are open to them, even in the advanced stage of the disease” (1998, p. 72). That our culture has 
this attitude leads to “excess disability,” a concept that articulates the “discrepancy that exists 
when a person’s functional incapacity is greater than that warranted by the actual impairment” 
(Brody, Kleban, Lawton, & Silverman, 1971, p. 124). When a person with Alzheimer’s is treated 
in ways that reasonably can be expected to diminish their self-esteem, it can actually lead to 
further losses of ability (Sabat, 2001).  
Pia Kontos (2006) described an embodied selfhood that persists throughout the 
progression of Alzheimer’s by drawing upon the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Pierre Bourdieu. She posited that the “presumed loss of selfhood is itself a product of the 
Western assumption that status as a full human being is completely dependent upon cognition 
and memory” (p. 195) and elaborated on the social model of Alzheimer’s disease as discussed by 
authors sampled above like Tom Kitwood, Stephen Post, and Steven Sabat. Kontos celebrated 
their humanistic contributions to our understandings of Alzheimer’s disease, but argued that 
“understandings about personhood and agency implicit in this revisioning derive from a 
presumed dichotomy between the body and the self” (2003, p. 159). The consequence, she 
argued, is that understandings of embodiment as a source of agency and selfhood have not been 
incorporated into the discourse on the subjective experience of Alzheimer’s disease, even by 
humanistic authors. Kontos instead suggested that the existential immediacy of the body as well 
as its interrelationship with culture and history describe a more accurate understanding of the 






claimed that selfhood “emanates from the body as a generative spontaneity that asserts itself in 
an improvised engagement with the world” (2006, p. 214).  
Alzheimer’s from a Phenomenological Perspective 
Alzheimer’s disease can be understood phenomenologically as a disease marked by an 
enduring and multifaceted transformation in the lifeworld. Some argue that the disease is 
characterized phenomenologically by “a disintegrating cognition [and] impairment of the body 
schema [which] leads to an impoverishment of the lifeworld” (D. H. Davis, 2004, p. 375). 
“Lifeworld” is a phenomenological term that describes how we actually experience and make 
meaning from living in the world in everyday situations and relations. Max van Manen 
foregrounded four different existential dimensions of the lifeworld that are fundamental to lived 
experience in general: “lived space (spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time 
(temporality) and lived human [and other-than-human] relation (relationality or communality)” 
(2016, p. 101). These dimensions of the lifeworld are understood as existential because they are 
aspects of the lived experience of all beings. Eva Simms described the lifeworld as the “field of 
being,” within which a coherent identity emerges: 
The relative coherence of human identity has its foundation not in the outline of the skin 
but in the coherence of a lived body as it is chiasmically woven into the places, people, 
and things of its world. Selfhood is a field of being, a particular matrix of interpersonal 
and spatial relationships with the body at its center (2008, p. 24). 
By foregrounding the lifeworld rather than a biomedical discourse as the starting point for 
investigating the phenomenon of Alzheimer’s disease, it is possible to avoid reducing a person to 
their physiological, and especially their neurological and cognitive dimensions.  






what the everyday lived experience of people with Alzheimer’s might be like. Questions emerge 
such as: what happens to a person when Alzheimer’s disease tugs loose the threads that weave 
her into the places, people and things of her lifeworld? And what happens to the places, people 
and things from which she becomes unwoven? How might memory function as the thread that 
actually weaves a person to her being-field? Do memories exist in the brain (as biomedical 
narratives assert), or might memories be phenomena that are more accurately described as being 
located in an embodied, cultural, relational field, beyond the periphery of the skin?  
The Anthropocene 
To understand the lifeworld means to understand lived experience within a specific 
situatedness in place and time. In this project, I will anchor this place and time in the frame of 
the Anthropocene. Although I locate my project in cultural phenomena that are situated within 
the United States, the context of the Anthropocene is an important one for my exploration of the 
lifeworld as I explore themes of being, forgetting, and dying within this time and place. The term 
“Anthropocene” literally means “the age of human,” and describes “a geological epoch in which 
earth’s atmosphere, lithosphere, and biosphere are shaped primarily by human forces” (Ellis, 
2009). The term was first born in the field of geology, to indicate that “human activity is largely 
responsible for the exit from the Holocene [the previous geological epoch], that is, that 
humankind has become a global geological force in its own right” (Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen, 
& McNeill, 2011, p. 843). I chose to situate this project in the context of the Anthropocene 
because it simultaneously captures the agent of change – human behaviors of exploitation, 
extraction, and consumption – and the systemic scope of the effects – all systems of the earth. 
Anthropocene describes a relational phenomenon between a particular type of human activity 






significance of the Anthropocene as a framework for understanding my project, what is more 
important is how the Anthropocene has made a particular kind of human life, a particular kind of 
subjectivity, the dominant mode, which has in turn made these deleterious effects on the planet 
possible. 
This global geological force – humankind – is changing our planet’s climate at a 
profoundly rapid pace, with devastating consequences already apparent. The US National 
Academy of Sciences first warned of a warming climate due to human activities as a major threat 
to humankind in 1979 (Archer & Rahmstorf, 2010, p. viii), and scientific evidence has been 
mounting ever since about the multitude of ways that humans have fundamentally altered the 
earth beyond climate, including deforestation, desertification, urbanization, and mass extinction. 
Some scientists argue that the Industrial Revolution beginning in the 1700s marks the beginning 
of the Anthropocene, when human activities shifted from subsistence agricultural means of 
altering ecologies to capitalist markets of extraction that were propelled by the use of fossil fuels, 
completely transforming the ecology and sociopolitical landscape of England and beyond by 
1850 (Steffen et al., 2011). Others argue that the beginning of settler colonization marks the start 
of the Anthropocene, with start dates ranging between 1492 and 1610, citing the importance of 
colonization as an engine for climate change (H. Davis & Todd, 2017, p. 766). This correlation 
connects the importance of decolonization as an intervention in slowing the climate chaos we see 
today. Importantly, these changes in human society were made by moving away from reciprocal 
economies toward extractive and exploitative economies, which required shifts in how people 
perceive the world and experience their existence (Kimmerer, 2013).  
The 1950s to the present is known as “The Great Acceleration,” a period when the scope 






the global human population doubled from 3 to 6 billion, economic activity rose 15-fold, fossil 
fuel use increased by a factor of 3.5, and over half the global population migrated to urban areas, 
leaving behind agricultural lifestyles and adopting consumerist ones (Steffen et al., 2011). This 
period of acceleration caused massive shifts in all aspects of the environment, impacting 
atmosphere, watersheds, biodiversity, and so on. See Figure 1 on the next page for a visual 
representation of the dramatic changes to the environment and to human economies over the 
Industrial Revolution. Since the turn of the 21st century, trends of the great acceleration have 
continued and expanded, as the consumption of fossil fuels has extended beyond the Western 
countries that drove it in the 20th century to include nations like China, India, Brazil, South 
Africa and Indonesia (Steffen et al., 2011). Although scientific recognition of climate change and 
biodiversity loss resulting from global human society began in the 1960s, the rates of change and 
loss have only accelerated since that time, “initiating a mass extinction episode unparalleled for 
65 million years,” meaning that “on human time scales, this loss would be effectively permanent 
because in the aftermath of past mass extinctions, the living world took hundreds of thousands to 
millions of years to rediversify” (Ceballos et al., 2015). The Anthropocene is a geological epoch 
of profound change and existential threat, whereby humans are rapidly destroying the ecologies 
that we are dependent upon for our own survival. 
In this dissertation, I unfold ideas around a global society that has seemingly forgotten 
what the means of reproduction of life are, such that we are actively creating a future in which 
human life will not thrive, with some scientists (albeit a minority) even predicting the possibility 
of civilization collapse within my lifetime (Bendell, 2018). Further, my Mom was born in 1946, 
meaning her lifetime entirely coincided with the period of great acceleration described above. 






time on earth, and I attempt to write into the forgetfulness of the Anthropocene by remembering 
my interwovenness with my Mom and our interwovenness with this time and place.  
Figure 1 
Figure 1. (a) The increasing rates of change in human activity since the beginning of the 









Figure 1, continued. (b) Changes to the Earth resulting from increase in human activity. 
 







The goal of this project is to explore what it was like to share a relational world with my 
Mom while she lived with Alzheimer’s disease and at the same time be deeply responsive to the 
sociopolitical and historical dynamics of living in the Anthropocene. I want my readers to feel in 
their bodies the rhythms of remembering, the textures of lifeworlds and temporal horizons 
shuffling. I want my readers to question what they have forgotten, to feel their own lacunas of 
belonging, and to inch toward the portals of liminality we are invited to enter by our forgetful 
elders. I also wanted this project to be a bridge that could keep me in connection with my Mom 
following her journey through living with Alzheimer’s disease. 
Given my personal connection to the subject, the umbrella method used in this 
dissertation is autoethnography. This method allowed me to explore the deeply interpersonal and 
emotional aspects of being in relation to my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s disease, and to 
move through the research process in my own embodiment and with my own wounded heart as a 
critical piece of what can be known about the experience of loving somebody with Alzheimer’s. 
Drawing from ethnographic roots and the “thick description” of cultural experience in 
meaningful context (Geertz, 1973), autoethnography opens up the investigation of embodied 
experience and addresses issues related to other ethnographic approaches of appropriation and 
exploitation of the Other as an appendage of colonial expansion. Using autoethnography allowed 
me to approach understanding the lived experience of being in relation to my Mom while she had 
Alzheimer’s disease within a particular sociocultural context, and to simultaneously respect that I 
cannot know what my Mom, or others with Alzheimer’s disease, are really experiencing. It 
allowed me to stay in my body and share what I know, which turns out to be a lot, while 






field between myself and my Mom was, and continues to be, a rich and mysterious place for 
exploration. As Merleau-Ponty wrote with respect to being in relationship, “It is in the space 
between him and me that it unfolds” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 63), meaning that existence 
becomes meaningful only through our interactions with our lifeworld. I took this deeply to heart 
as I prioritized autoethnography as my method of choice and trusted that the relational field 
between my Mom and I was a place where a meaningful understanding of being, forgetting, and 
dying in the Anthropocene could be found. Adams and Holman Jones wrote that 
autoethnographies, like queer theory, “take up selves, beings, ‘I’s, even as they work against a 
stable sense of such self-subjects or experience and instead work to map how self-subjects are 
accomplished in interaction and act in and upon the world” (T. Adams & Holman Jones, 2008, p. 
379). 
Through the exploration of my relating to my Mom and of reading other accounts of 
living with Alzheimer’s, I attempted to examine how certain existential facets of life are altered 
through the experience of Alzheimer’s disease as well as by loving somebody who has 
Alzheimer’s. I looked at how my Mom and others with Alzheimer’s experience embodiment and 
dwelling in a place and time, how they relate to things, and how they relate to other beings, 
human and otherwise. Some of these descriptions were influenced by phenomenological methods 
of inquiry, most explicitly from the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I resisted adapting a 
structured incorporation of phenomenological methods of inquiry, however, as I wished to keep 
my mode of inquiring into this topic as open to improvisation and creative expression as 
possible. Therefore, I did not adapt the work of thinkers like Amedeo Giorgi (2009), who created 
a very structured form of doing phenomenological research.   






forgetting, and dying in the sociopolitical global epoch we are in, which may be called by many 
names, which I will call the Anthropocene. I explore how a close observation of the lived 
experience of people with Alzheimer’s disease exposes shortcomings in how we care for one 
another, due to structural issues such as colonialism and capitalism and their resulting 
stratifications of power and erosion of familial and communal support networks, as well as our 
alienation from place and our extractive relationship with the earth. I examine the apparently 
fluid subjectivity of people with Alzheimer’s may offer us a new perspective on living and dying 
well in an era of deep, collective forgetfulness about our interconnectedness with human and 
non-human beings. 
Autoethnography and Critical Bifocality 
Autoethnography is most simply defined as a method of research that studies the self in 
relation to culture. It aims to use the researcher’s “personal experience to describe and critique 
cultural beliefs, practices, and experiences” (T. E. Adams, Holman Jones, & Ellis, 2015, p. 1). It 
is a method that first began to be articulated in the 1970s, initially as a reparative move to 
ethnographic research, which was under scrutiny for its lack of reflexivity of the researcher. The 
problem that resulted from the lack of reflexivity was that ethnography was being used as a tool 
of colonialism, describing “the Other” without grasping the positioning of the researcher being 
implicitly positioned as superior, more civilized, and so on. Furthermore, ethnography was used 
as a political tool for colonial expansion. This is not a metaphor (Tuck & Yang, 2012): academic 
anthropology and the practice of ethnography was intentionally and explicitly used as an 
appendage of the state for “the construction of colonial and neo-colonial societies through 
ethnographic practice” (Pels & Salemink, 1994, p. 1). The emerging method of autoethnography 






cultures, and to open up a critical reflection on their own positionality and culture, which tended 
to be obscured in ethnography. The method that took shape dialogues personal experience with 
cultural critique, revealing situated aspects of the relation of self to culture in ways that may 
reveal, question, resist, or transform normative cultural discourses in the researcher’s home 
culture(s) (T. E. Adams et al., 2015). 
Autoethnography is sometimes dismissed as a “navel-gazing” method that dwells in the 
personal to such a degree that it is not relatable or a source of valuable information (Sparkes, 
2002). And indeed, there are examples of the method being used in such a way that is not 
sufficiently connected to a cultural investigation. It is true that autoethnography goes against 
dominant paradigms of research by prizing the subjective as an important form of knowledge. 
Against accusations that autoethnography is self-indulgent, Arthur Bochner and Carolyn Ellis 
(2016) argued that researchers are more susceptible to self-indulgence when they practice 
methods that allow them to believe that their subjectivity, including their social locations along 
race, gender, and class lines, can be prevented from “contaminating” their science.  
One of the clear advantages to autoethnography is that it is evocative and embodied, 
recognizing “the embodied person as an epistemically fruitful condition for the production of 
knowledge” (Breuer & Roth, 2005, p. 426). Being able to write about your own embodied, 
affective experience of the self-culture relationship provides important information that is 
difficult to access in less embodied ways. These experiences can be written about in a way that 
evoke embodied learning on behalf of the reader as well. Not only is this a valuable form of 
information, but it is a form of knowledge that is in short supply in our current sociopolitical 
climate, and thus gives access to a type of knowledge that may be especially revealing about 






autoethnography is still very much emerging and expanding, particularly in its potential to both 
evoke empathic and affective responses at a time of public numbness, a practice crucial to 
making scholarly research relevant to the work of global citizenship” (2019, p. 4). 
Autoethnography is not another form of memoir, in that autoethnography explores and prioritizes 
the cultural dimension of personal experience, it engages with and extends existing research, and 
it makes a direct appeal to the embodied experience of the reader (S. Jones, Adams, & Ellis, 
2016). 
This overarching framework of moving between embodied, lived personal experience 
and sociopolitical context is captured well by the term “critical bifocality.” Critical bifocality is a 
term introduced by Michelle Fine and Lois Weis, who articulated it as: “a theory of method in 
which researchers try to make visible the sinewy linkages or circuits through which structural 
conditions are enacted in policy and reform institutions as well as the ways in which such 
conditions come to be woven into community relationships and metabolized by individuals” 
(2012, p. 174). Critical bifocality, although not confined to articulating personal experience and 
often used in ethnographies as well, aims to understand how structures of sociopolitical power 
get under our skin, and so there is a generative resonance between autoethnography and critical 
bifocality.  
Why use autoethnography in my dissertation? Because as I aim to understand 
interdependence with people who have Alzheimer’s disease within this sociohistorical moment, I 
wanted to get as close with all my senses as I could. One of the significant challenges with this 
work is that as the disease progresses, people with Alzheimer’s tend to lose their ability to speak. 
The world of words gets loose and different forms of communication are needed, which move 






Alzheimer’s? Traditional methods such as interviews are helpful with people in the early stages 
of the disease, but are simply not practical or possibly even ethical in the later stages. This 
conundrum is played out in scientific research, as there are far fewer studies that examine the 
lived experience in the moderate or severe stages of the disease than there are in the mild earlier 
stages.  
Prizing this ethical conundrum, I decided to ask myself instead: how am I in relation to 
my Mom? Understanding that I would only get a partial perspective of her experience this way, I 
wanted to make a case for the particular positioning I have had in relation to her that gives access 
to the intersubjective realm of experience. My body began from her body, and my spirit from 
hers. She trained my senses in my childhood and I am fluent in the language of her touch, 
gestures, facial expressions, all of which she continued to communicate through up until her 
death. Without the rhythm of relating between self and other, there is no self: “there is no ‘inner’ 
life that is not a first attempt to relate to another person” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 67). Both my 
Mom and I have become who we are together, through one another, amongst our many other 
relationships. Autoethnography allowed me to document my observations from a deeply felt 
sense of my own experience of being in relation to her. It gave me a chance to express the 
language of relating to her that I know in my bones. It is a method which allowed me to do 
research in a home of relational ethics. It allowed me to be flexible and creative, and gave me 
authority to share what I have learned from my Mom about our journey through her experience 
of Alzheimer’s disease. 
Phenomenological Inquiry 
My dissertation is informed by phenomenological inquiry, which I used like a tool within 






phenomenological investigation I explored by examining how the core existential facets of life 
are altered through the experience of Alzheimer’s: how she experiences embodiment and 
dwelling in a place and time, how she relates to things, and how she relates to other beings, 
human and otherwise.  
Phenomenology offers a way into lived experience through the lifeworld, the world as we 
live it, pre-reflectively rather than conceptually. It allows for the “study of lived or existential 
meanings; it attempts to describe and interpret these meanings to a certain degree of depth and 
richness” (Van Manen, 2016, p. 11). I am attracted to the way that phenomenology understands 
existence, that it researches what it means to be human, to be attuned to others and to the world 
around us, to see the hidden under the apparent. Phenomenology sees that “the ‘external’ world, 
body and consciousness are all fundamentally intertwined, inter-relating and mutually 
influencing” (Allen‐Collinson, 2011, p. 3). It is an exceptionally useful methodological attitude 
to use to describe relationality. I resonate with Allen-Collinson’s description of the gift of the 
phenomenological attitude, which she describes as “one of enchantment, an attempt to suspend 
our ‘adult’ knowledge and preconceptions in order to view the world through the fresh, excited, 
‘naive’ eyes of childhood” (Allen‐Collinson, 2011, p. 5). This especially resonates with my 
project, where my embodied memories of being with my Mom were the playground of 
experience that I drew from for my analyses. 
If the psychological dimension of human life cannot be captured by quantitative forms of 
analysis, Maurice Merleau-Ponty asks in The World of Perception, what else can we know about 
it, and how? He invited psychological inquiry to depart from Cartesian dualism, pointing instead 
toward a cohesive world of meaning accessible through perception, which cannot be known by a 






perception is accessible through bodily engagement in the sensorial world within which one 
dwells; it welcomes those who approach with a playful and embodied method of understanding. 
Indeed, “we live meanings through bodily participation in the world” (Todres, 2007, p. 33), and 
so I attended to topics like how people with Alzheimer’s move through the world, and how the 
people in their lives move around and with them.  
Bracketing is an especially helpful practice that I borrowed from phenomenology. 
Alzheimer’s disease has a sedimented discourse around it as a biomedical, neurological disorder. 
As our culture has become increasingly obsessed with understanding the brain as the central 
locus of who we are and how we experience the world, Alzheimer’s and other neurocognitive 
disorders have been associated with the loss of self, the loss of identity, death in life (Behuniak, 
2011). Van Manen described bracketing as a way to “come to terms with our assumptions, not in 
order to forget them again, but rather to hold them deliberately at bay and even to turn this 
knowledge against itself, as it were, thereby exposing its shallow and concealing character” 
(2016, p. 47). It was therefore a helpful practice to lift off this sedimented discourse around 
Alzheimer’s disease and get curious about what it may be like to live with it, both being 
embedded in such discourses and on a more embodied, pre-verbal level of experience.  
Cultural Criticism 
An important part of my dissertation was to eventually flip the question on its head and 
ask: what can we learn from our most forgetful elders about what it means to remember, to be, 
and die in the Anthropocene? We, who have forgotten so much about being in relationship with 
each other and with the broader ecology of non-human beings with whom we live and upon who 
we depend for our survival. To ask this question means I already have a critique, clearly, of our 






what is going wrong with our society, and what we might be able to learn about how we can 
improve it from people living with Alzheimer’s.  
The cultural critique part of the dissertation is the least connected with a particular 
method, but it falls under the umbrella of autoethnography nonetheless, as it examines the culture 
we are situated in. I drew inspiration here from Indigenous and other thinkers who contemplate 
colonialism, socialist feminist thinkers, and ecopsychologists, among others, to make sense of 
our sociopolitical context. My aim was to look closely at the sociocultural context within which 
people in the United States (and to some extent the broader globalized Western world) have 
Alzheimer’s. To get descriptive about the structures that get under our skin. Again, this picks up 
the critical bifocality discussed above, and this time centers the context, and positions people 
with Alzheimer’s as the ones who may have something important to teach the rest of us.  
A Twist in the Project with my Mother’s Death 
My Mom died in April of 2019. While I began this dissertation as a project for me to 
learn how to stay in connection with her through all the changes she was going through, the task, 
in some ways, changed after her death. When I began this project, I planned to incorporate more 
“live” observation, using data collection practices such as field notes. Following her death, I 
transitioned the project somewhat to be focused instead on data collection from my own 
memories. Van Manen wrote, “sometimes the best anecdotes are re-collected as one tries to 
make sense of things that somehow seem interesting now, in hindsight” (Van Manen, 2016, p. 
69, italics in the original). This project saw me through the beginning of hindsight, as she died 
after it began.  
While my relationship with my Mom is ongoing, since she died my experience of being 






healthy. In the few months immediately following her death, I experienced memories of her 
more vivid than any I’ve ever had before, as I will detail in the chapter “Time Traveling.” 
Memories that felt real, as if what I was remembering was actually happening in the present. 
Perhaps this dissertation would have had different findings if she were still alive throughout the 
project. The timing of her death is, regardless, simply an important part of the introduction to this 
work, as it influenced not only my data collection methods but also surely my resulting data and 
analysis.  
Data collection 
The primary data collection for this dissertation is a series of written recollections 
presented as vignettes about my experience of being with my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s 
disease. I also collected other sources of data such as artifacts and previously written 
observations to supplement my written recollections. I analyzed those data using 
phenomenological and critical cultural and psychological interpretations in subsections following 
each vignette. I collected personal memory data (Chang, 2008), that is, a series of recollections I 
have about interacting with my Mom throughout my lifetime, primarily focused on our 
relationship during the time she had Alzheimer’s disease. I focused on emotionally resonant 
memories, so as to mirror one of my observations about her: that emotional resonance is a 
compass. In choosing these recollections, I aimed to stay primarily with my embodied, lived 
experience, and to write evocatively, so as to inspire resonance in my readers. The vignettes were 
selected to prevent redundancy in my analyses and to contribute to a coherent gestalt. 
After writing several recollection vignettes, the next step in my process was to analyze 






cultural criticism lens depending on what seems to be implicitly suggestive in the vignette. This 
structure of first crafting a number of stories and then allowing a theoretical interpretation 
emerge from the stories themselves is inspired by the dissertation of Dorothy Cashore (2019), 
who wrote an ecopsychological authoethnography using a similar structure. Part of what attracts 
me to the method with which Cashore wrote her dissertation is that the series of stories can be 
read independently of the theory and cultural criticism that emerges in the following analyses, 
making the text more experience-near and potentially accessible to a wider audience.   
Summary 
Studying the lived experience of Alzheimer’s disease within the sociopolitical context of 
Western neoliberal colonialism and the Anthropocene can contribute to the working knowledge 
we use to make decisions about caring for people with Alzheimer’s, as well as open questions to 
what we might learn from our forgetful elders in a sociopolitical context that requires a 
forgetting of interdependence in order to be reproduced. This dissertation aims not only to 
further progress the lineage of humanistic and phenomenological-anthropological understandings 
of Alzheimer’s disease, a body of work which primarily serves to critique, correct and repair the 
problems of biomedical discourses on Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias. This dissertation 
aims to step beyond the position of reparative reading of people with Alzheimer’s, to establish a 
generative reading of what we might learn from the wisdom of our elders with Alzheimer’s 







Chapter 2: The Elephant in the Room 
One of the most tender parts of my experience in being with my Mom while she had 
Alzheimer’s Disease is that she never spoke with me about that fact that she had it. Not once 
over the four years that she was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s. Not in the year before that when 
she had a diagnosis of Mild Cognitive Impairment. Or in the five years before that, when her 
“chemo brain” made everyone in my family spend time in private with their fears that she may 
be developing Alzheimer’s. A decade altogether that Alzheimer’s loomed over my family, 
shrouded in secrecy and denial. Writing that sentence makes my chest feel like there are steel 
plates weighing down on it. I sigh.  
I recall the closest I ever got to discussing her diagnosis directly with her. My parents 
were still living in Portland, Oregon at the time, and I must have been around 26 years old. It was 
a warm, sunny summer day, and I was sitting in their backyard reading. Spending time at my 
parents’ house after I graduated from college always made me feel like I was back in high school 
again. I lived in Seattle at the time and would often spend a few nights with them when I came to 
visit, to make the 3-hour drive worth it. Sleeping in my old twin bed, all my belongings from 
high school still decorating my bedroom, posters from movies I used to like still hanging on the 
walls, it was like a time capsule in my bedroom from when I was 18 years old. It was easy for 
me to revert back to feeling like a teenager: misunderstood, easily annoyed, defensive.  
On this visit, my parents happened to have an appointment with my Mom’s neurologist, 
who had diagnosed her with Mild Cognitive Impairment and had insisted that she not be allowed 
to drive anymore. This was a major blow to my Mom’s sense of independence, and she was 
incredulous. She came outside to see what I was doing, and her rage followed her, red under her 






were lying and trying to take her driver’s license away, and that she was just fine. She was 
furious with my Dad and suspected that he was the mastermind who had found these doctors 
willing to lie and take away her independence. The air around her seemed to turn red and electric 
with her anger.  
Moments like these pose a question to loved ones. Do you join with her? Argue another 
perspective? Distract and deflect? Being her daughter in this situation brought all of these 
questions into the framework of our relationship and throttled us by spatial association into the 
time period when I was in high school. That meant that disagreeing would make me the stubborn 
child. Redirecting would make me patronizing. Joining with would make me collude with 
something seemingly dangerous and would increase the emotional labor for my Dad if I blew 
wind in the sails of her demand to keep her driver’s license. The small child in me, whose 
relationship to her mother was simple, loving, and utterly dependent, was terrified that my Mom 
was saying something with such raw emotion that I simply did not understand: what does she 
mean, my Dad is the mastermind? 
Years later, it is easier to analyze these options of how I might have responded. Now that 
I’ve had several years of engaging with my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s disease in the time 
since this story took place, I have learned many lessons about what worked and what didn’t 
when trying to connect with her. Training to become a clinical psychologist in the later years of 
her illness also helped me learn communication strategies like reflection and resonance. But at 
the time, this was still new for me, and what to do was not so clear. When it happened, I felt 
confused and put on the spot, but hungry for the slight acknowledgement—even 






I did what I could to try to receive her anger and calm her down, but I’ll readily admit I 
didn’t do a great job. I felt so emotionally torn, and at first I tried to avoid the conversation 
entirely by offering her a glass of water, hoping that it would redirect her. That only made her 
angrier, and understandably so – I was not offering any resonance to her devastating anger about 
losing her driver’s license. It is hard for me to remember what happened after that – the 
powerful, flashbulb part of this memory was the startle I felt by her partial acknowledgement and 
anger. What I do remember is that I tried to side with her neurologist, asking why a doctor would 
lie to her. Looking back, I imagine it was hurtful to my Mom for me to “stick to the facts.” But 
something about deviating from them felt scary, like I may just be stoking the flames of her 
anger. And more than anything, I wanted to connect with her about the most difficult thing that 
has ever happened to me: my Mom having Alzheimer’s. I was desperate for her to meet me in 
that fact, so I did everything I could to try to make her join me there. It was to no avail.  
Denial 
Denial is a common experience of people with Alzheimer’s disease, especially in the 
early stages. Denial is “an instant, nonreflective process,” which is different from the more 
conscious process of repression; denial says “This is not happening,” while repression says “This 
happened, but I’ll forget about it because it’s too painful” (McWilliams, 2011, p. 103). Another 
way to understand denial is as a process of “avoiding awareness of aspects of external reality that 
are difficult to face by disregarding sensory data” (Gabbard, 2014, p. 37). By disregarding 
sensory data, denial can be understood to happen unconsciously, that is, before any conscious 
arrangement or interpretation of sensory information has happened. Although denial is 






it is commonly experienced by people in both benign and more troubling situations throughout 
the lifespan. For example, denial is common in emergency situations where denying the intense 
emotional response of a life-threatening situation can make the difference between life and death, 
such as denying overwhelming fear in order to run toward a fire to rescue someone. However, 
denial can also lead to life-threatening situations, such as when people misuse psychoactive 
substances and deny they have a problem to such a degree that they become seriously ill or even 
die. 
Imagine that you are in the 7th decade of your life, and you notice you are starting to 
forget things that once came easy to you: the name of your friend’s wife, the route home from 
across town. After putting it off for some time, you make an appointment with a neurologist after 
a scary incident of getting lost and not remembering where you live. After a series of tests, 
possibly a PET scan, your doctor gives you the news: you have probable Major Neurocognitive 
Disorder due to Alzheimer’s Disease. A fatal disease. Although Alzheimer’s disease looms in 
our cultural consciousness as a well-known illness among older adults, what the general public 
thinks about is the forgetfulness, not the deadliness. Being diagnosed with a terminal illness that 
causes the steady decline of short- and long-term memory faculties, as well as the loss of speech, 
motor skills, and the ability to live independently is, understandably, devastating to most people. 
When the degree of loss is considered, psychological defenses like denial make perfect sense.  
In the history of the field of psychology through the 20th and beginning of the 21st 
centuries, there has generally been a movement from predominantly psychoanalytic descriptions 
of psychological phenomena in the era of Sigmund Freud, to other epistemologies, first with 
behavioral explanations, then social explanations, and finally neurological explanations coming 






brain, both research and cultural discourses at large about why we experience the world the way 
we do began to favor neurological explanations, boiling down to the explanation that a series of 
neurons firing creates your lived experience. It was perhaps an over-correction of the 
psychoanalytic heyday in which experience was explained through unconscious drives. It is not a 
coincidence that neurological descriptions also neutralized “blame” away from the person, as 
well as away from environmental and political factors. By locating psychological phenomena 
primarily in the brain, neither personal nor sociopolitical change was actually required; rather 
these phenomena could be “managed” through the use of psychopharmaceuticals, a multi-billion-
dollar industry. By the 2010s, a more concerted movement to integrate these various 
explanations started to spread through the field, and a biopsychosocial approach has recently 
become the aspirational norm, although in practice there remains an emphasis on neurological 
factors.  
A biopsychosocial description of the phenomenon of denial in people with Alzheimer’s 
disease is a complicated endeavor, one that I will briefly outline here. When attending to the 
biological phenomena in the experience of denial in people with Alzheimer’s disease, the most 
relevant concept is “anosognosia,” which describes a “lack of awareness about illness or 
impairment” that correlates with brain lesions and neurodegenerative diseases (Mograbi, Brown, 
& Morris, 2009, p. 989). Anosognosia essentially describes the faulty neurological functioning of 
the ability to internally monitor one’s cognitive and behavioral functioning. Anosognosia is “not 
an ‘all or none’ phenomenon and it can vary in degree, from a lack of concern and attention to a 
neurological deficit to explicit verbal denial” (Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004, p. 275). 
Anosognosia includes multiple aspects of unawareness. Importantly, it traces the origin of the 






relationship between degree of awareness deficits and generalized cognitive impairment, based 
upon measures of global cognitive functioning, memory, attention and language. (Burgess, 
Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). It is no surprise that explanations of human 
behavior that focus on brain activity include exactly the kind of denial that I wish to unpack in 
this chapter. There is a denial that the biological theory is incomplete despite clear limitations of 
this perspective. 
From a psychological perspective, Glen Gabbard describes denial as a way that people 
with Alzheimer’s “defend against catastrophic anxiety by avoiding awareness of their defects” 
(2014, p. 388). Integrating the new information about having Alzheimer’s disease requires also 
integrating that you may forget your loved ones; that you may forget important aspects of who 
you are; and that, more than ever before in your life, you are approaching death. Denial in this 
sense is an adaptive coping response to mitigate the catastrophic emotional impact that this 
information can have. Denial allows for a certain experience of life as open-ended and 
unimpaired to continue. It allows for the (more or less) seamless continuity of a lifeworld.  
Lisa Snyder, a clinical social worker who has dedicated her career to better understanding 
the subjective experience of people living with Alzheimer’s disease, compiled a series of 
interviews of people describing their lived experience of Alzheimer’s. One person she 
interviewed, whose pseudonym is Bill, described his experience of being diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s: 
At age 54, it seemed like I was labeled incompetent after a lifetime of proficiency. The 
psychologist who tested me said that I would find it increasingly arduous to work, or 






clinic and into a fresh San Diego night feeling like a very hopeless and broken man. […] 
I wondered if there was anything for me to live for. (Snyder, 2009, p. 41)  
Although Bill does not describe denial in part of his first reaction to being diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s, his wrenching description makes clear what is at stake, and why someone may 
grapple to integrate this information into their lifeworld, and how it could trigger a feeling of 
catastrophic anxiety. The diagnosis is threatening to his identity as a person who has always been 
proficient. 
In addition to this classic understanding of denial, there’s an additional psychological 
component to why denial may be called upon by people with Alzheimer’s that is specific to the 
common feature of the disease of decreasing and ultimately ceasing ability to learn or remember 
new information, as well as the phenomenon that short-term memory tends to decline earlier and 
more thoroughly than long-term memory. “Because recent memory tends to be sacrificed before 
remote memory, many patients can clearly recollect how they used to be, which makes their 
current dysfunctional state all the more disturbing to them” (Gabbard, 2014, p. 389). The more 
disturbing the new information about oneself is, the more likely a person is to draw upon blunt 
defensive coping strategies like denial. 
How is denial a social phenomenon? “Denial masks shame” (Wilson, 2003, p. 286). Or, 
in other words, denial is a strategy that is unconsciously employed to avoid the feeling of shame. 
Because the experience of shame can be so painful, it is common for the shame to “go 
underground” and be the agent of other defense mechanisms including denial (Scheff, 2004, p. 
231). Denial is an escape hatch from the uncomfortable feeling of shame, and the relational 
consequences of disconnection, which also can decrease one’s felt sense of safety and belonging. 






connection” (Hartling, Rosen, Walker, & Jordan, 2000, p. 3). Shame exists in “an interpersonal 
context that is inextricably tied to relationships and connection [and to] the real or perceived 
failure of meeting cultural expectations” (Brown, 2006, p. 45). Denial from this perspective is a 
relational strategy that aims to maintain cohesion of identity and relational connections within a 
particular lifeworld by covering over a threatening truth. Returning to Bill’s testimony from 
above, his statement that he was “labeled incompetent after a lifetime of proficiency” (Snyder, 
2009, p. 41) is exactly the kind of threatening truth that could generate a feeling that one is 
unworthy of belonging, if they identify their self-worth strongly with being proficient, as many 
Americans do.  
Additionally, there are cultural influences on denial in the context of someone with 
Alzheimer’s disease. The scope of this study is focused primarily on the culture in the United 
States, however there are some similarities that extend beyond the US due to globalization and 
neoliberal imperialism. Of major import here is that the US has a culture of death denial perhaps 
unparalleled in the rest of human history. Over the last 100 to 150 years as death care became 
outsourced to hospitals and other businesses, the average lifespan extended, infant mortality rate 
decreased, and urbanization drove people to be disconnected from the animal death involved in 
their subsistence, people simply became less exposed to death. Knowledge about caring for 
people who are dying as well as how to tend to their bodies after death was lost as this 
outsourcing began. The impact of a culture of death denial in many ways returns to the 
phenomena of shame and fear: shame for being cast an outsider due to being terminally ill, and 
fear about experiencing death, a fear which is exaggerated because there is more about dying that 






 Death became hidden, covered over, denied. In this sense, the cultural influence on 
denial in people with Alzheimer’s disease is the same as any person facing a terminal illness. 
Add onto that a cultural understanding in the last 100 years in the US shifting ever more toward 
human subjectivity as defined primarily by cognition, no doubt influenced by the increasing 
economy of information. People with Alzheimer’s disease are facing both their own death and 
the decline of that part of them that is most valued in our culture: their cognition. Falling out of 
belonging to a culture with which a person once felt strongly identified can easily lead to the 
feelings of incoherence that can trigger a response of denial.  
Although denial is only rarely addressed in psychological research as an intersubjective 
or relational phenomenon, it is possible that the social aspects of denial may be the most 
powerful. Interpersonal and intersubjective theories of psychology and psychotherapy, such as 
Relational Cultural Theory (Jordan, 2018), illuminate the incredible importance of the social 
world on our psychological experience. The question that this brings up, is where exactly does 
denial exist? Is denial an internal psychological device? Or does it exist in the space between two 
or more people? Is it socially co-constructed? Eva Simms wrote, “The relative coherence of 
human identity has its foundation not in the outline of the skin but in the coherence of a lived 
body as it is chiasmically woven into the places, people, and things of its world. Selfhood is a 
field of being, a particular matrix of interpersonal and spatial relationships with the body at its 
center” (Simms, 2008, p. 24). Denial is a device that aims to maintain the relative coherence of 
human identity against threats of incoherence, and it is co-created by the places, people and 
things within someone’s field of being. 
Next, I will flip the question around from how denial shows up in people with 






people with Alzheimer’s are not the “other,” and that we may have a great deal to learn about 
being, forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene from people with Alzheimer’s.   
Denial in the Culture 
The preceding subsection explored denial in an individual person. Denial is not only an 
intrapsychic phenomenon; it exists relationally, culturally, and institutionally as well. Stanley 
Cohen (2013, p.1) wrote:  
One common thread runs through the many different stories of denial: people, 
organizations, governments or whole societies are presented with information that is too 
disturbing, threatening or anomalous to be fully absorbed or openly acknowledged. The 
information is therefore somehow repressed, disavowed, pushed aside or reinterpreted. 
Or else the information “registers” well enough, but its implications — cognitive, 
emotional or moral — are evaded, neutralized or rationalized away.  
Denial is baked into the foundation of American culture. If we consider our foundation to be in 
part determined by the artifact of the declaration of independence, especially the phrase “life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” we can examine what kinds of roots it may hold of our 
collective denial. An aspirational phrase, “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” delineates 
good from bad: we want life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and we don’t want death, 
bondage or suffering. This aspiration, however, was intended only for white, land-owning men. 
The occurrence of denial here is twofold: it is the refusal of granting these ideals for anyone who 
was not in this category of people, and at the same time, a covering up of that fact by using 







Although there are myriad artifacts of United States culture that could demonstrate our 
flair for denial, this phrase captures something important. The way we have taken up this phrase 
as a central motto to explain who we are and what our values are as a nation casts light on some 
of our shadows. It is not a coincidence that evidence of this phrase’s opposite—death, bondage, 
and suffering—is kept hidden, if not outright denied in our culture. Indeed, our use of death, 
bondage, and suffering as tools to colonize Indigenous peoples and enslave Africans made the 
founding of the United States possible. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote, “Our nation was born in 
genocide… We are perhaps the only nation which tried as a matter of national policy to wipe out 
its Indigenous population” (2000, p. 110). This fact is mostly denied, forgotten about, or painted 
over with a rosy hue. Historian Wai-Chee Dimock quotes from nonfiction sources in the time of 
Andrew Jackson’s presidency: “whereas European powers ‘conquer only to enslave,’ America, 
being ‘a free nation,’ ‘conquers only to bestow freedom.’ … Far from being antagonistic, 
‘empire’ and ‘liberty’ are instrumentally conjoined.” (Dimock, 1989, p. 9). Denial in the national 
consciousness of the US functions as an important psychological device that turns genocide into 
a means of liberation, “reconciling empire and liberty—based on the violent taking of Indigenous 
lands—into a usable myth allowed for the emergence of an enduring populist imperialism.” 
(Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014, p. 106).  
Sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel wrote, “the past is also part of a social reality that, while 
far from being absolutely objective, nonetheless transcends our subjectivity and is commonly 
shared by others as well” (1996, p. 283). The social reality, particularly established and 
maintained by the ruling class of the United States through educational, political, and media 
programs, uses denial strategically. “The study of national history is a major part of the general 






example, in late 2020 as I drafted this dissertation, an article was published in the Washington 
Post describing former President Trump’s plans to modify standards of how history is taught in 
public schools in the US: “Trump said he would create a national commission to promote a ‘pro-
American curriculum that celebrates the truth about our nation’s great history,’ which he said 
would encourage educators to teach students about the ‘miracle of American history,’ […] 
casting any criticism of the United States, even of slavery, as unpatriotic” (Balingit & Meckler, 
2020). Here, acknowledgement of any inhumane practices on behalf of the United States 
Government would be seen as unpatriotic even in a classroom setting. Denial of particular 
histories is often used as a strategy to advance particular ideologies.  
Cohen identified that “each variant of denial appears in the official discourse: literal 
(nothing happened); interpretive (what happened is really something else) and implicatory (what 
happened is justified). […] The contradictory elements form a deep structure: their relationship 
to each other is ideological, rather than logical” (S. Cohen, 2013, p. 103). In the above example, 
Trump literally denied that the US was founded through the labor of slavery, calling it instead “a 
miracle,” while simultaneously interpreting the fact of slavery as justified and implying that it 
would therefore be unpatriotic to criticize slavery. The three forms of denial are delivered 
together, supporting an ideology of nationalism. This strategy of denial linked with ideology 
makes it so that those who acknowledge the fact of slavery and the moral implication of our 
country having done harm via the institution of slavery, become cast as outsiders and even as 
enemies to the identity of being an American. 
Denial here is used as a mechanism to define the borders of national identity. Denial aims 
to maintain coherence of an identity, even a national identity, by eliminating information that 






spontaneous personal act. It is also regulated by unmistakably social rules of remembrance that 
tell us quite specifically what we should remember and what we can or must forget” (Zerubavel, 
1996, p. 286). American denialism is particularly invested in the denial of accountability for 
causing harm, which prevents any meaningful reparations or changes in behavior from occurring. 
Eviatar Zerubavel wrote, “society delineates the scope of our attention and concern, it also 
delimits our mental reach into the past by setting certain historical horizons beyond which past 
events are basically regarded as irrelevant and, as such, often forgotten altogether” (1996, p. 
286). This is maintained in the United States through legal and economic structures, in which 
“individual responsibility could be masked in corporate personality… a legal abstraction” 
(Miner, 1976, p. xi,). The structure of public roles, such as a professional or a political title, acts 
as a shield from personal accountability, bolstering outright denial through limitations of 
responsibility protected by the division between one’s professional and personal personas. This, 
importantly, is what Hannah Arendt (1963) described as the “banality of evil” that allowed the 
atrocities of the holocaust to take place: because people followed the orders of their job duties 
they could deny personal responsibility.  
There is a crucial parallel between the phenomenology of denial in people with 
Alzheimer’s disease and the phenomenology of cultural denial. When denial says, “That did not 
happen,” it re-writes our shared memory of a time and a place, re-configuring it. Part of what is 
painful about loving somebody who has Alzheimer’s disease is what happens when your own 
mental rendition of reality does not map onto theirs in the same way that it used to. In the story 
that precedes this section, I described how painful it was to not exist in a shared reality with my 
Mom about the devastating fact that she had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. That 






which in this example had the effect of minimizing or overlooking how dysregulating and 
upsetting it feels to not have a shared sense of reality with others, particularly parents and other 
early attachment figures. Therein lies the fallout of denial: a severing of connection.  
We form attachments not only with our caregivers, lovers and children, but also with our 
cultures, the histories we inherit, the land we live on, the air we breathe, the water we drink. Life 
is public and intimate everywhere. Denial aims to protect an internal coherence of any identity – 
be it personal, familial, or cultural – by rupturing connection with any person or fact that 
represents something that could be threatening to that internal coherence. Because we are deeply 
intersubjectively organized, when someone or something we have attachments to claims a 
different version of reality than the one we think we are in, we have a choice: maintain the 
attachment and leave our understanding of reality, or sever (or at least create a boundary in) the 
attachment and preserve our own understanding of reality. In the case with my Mom, at times I 
joined her in her lived lifeworld when she was living with Alzheimer’s, I left my own 
understanding of reality (which I will discuss in the “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits” 
chapter), an experience that was both painful and, at times, rewarding.  
Our attachments to history, culture, place, and to one another are all relevant to the 
Anthropocene. Climate chaos is a result of the sociopolitical structures that have been driven by 
colonization and capitalism, the sociopolitical structures that we and our ancestors for many 
generations have called home, despite the persistent alienation and disconnection these structures 
have created. Climate chaos is an existential threat in multiple ways: most obviously with 
ecosystem collapse that threatens agricultural production, and with the changes in climate 
making highly populated terrains uninhabitable. But the existential threat has a trickle-down 






histories, cultures, and people we are attached to as well. Denial of the catastrophic anxiety it can 
produce to feel your whole lifeworld threatened is a predictable response. 
Understanding the mechanics of denial, and its relationship to attachment and supporting 
a felt sense of internal coherence can also help us navigate a society that uses denial strategically 
to cover over harm done in the era of the Anthropocene, both historically and in the present day. 
What people with Alzheimer’s disease can teach us about navigating this existential threat 
brought about by the Anthropocene is that it is most important to focus on the underlying 
emotion – existential anxiety that threatens to sever our connection with our primary attachments 
to people, place, and our sense of self. Offering connection, resonance, and love can be a 
powerful antidote to denial. When working with institutional denial, creating these conditions 
means generating visions for the future that involve radical, inclusive transformation rather than 
staying in a place of critiquing the present and past. While critique is an important practice of 
inquiry and understanding, it is not the most effective cognitive / affective strategy for generating 
change among people and institutions in denial (Sedgwick, 2003). Indeed, the institutions that 
have generated the conditions of the Anthropocene have used disconnection strategically as a 
way to accumulate power, and denial as a way of maintaining those power differences. Silvia 
Federici (2018) wrote that our embodied love of and attachment to the world has been disrupted 
by these institutions. She described how millions of years of human evolution and adaptation to 
the natural world have generated in us certain needs for survival that also constitute our main 
sources of resistance to exploitation. Her evocative words here are worth quoting directly: “I 
refer to our need for the sun, the wind, the sky, the need for touching, smelling, sleeping, making 
love, and being in the open air” (Federici, 2018, p. 190). She explains that these needs are 






against those whose domination is most required for the reproduction of our society. Moving 
toward connection, supporting attachment, offering resonance, generating visions of abundance 
and connection for the future – these are all strategies of working with denial that address the 
underlying affect and bolster a way of being in the world that resists the ideologies that 







Chapter 3: Things: An Ellipsis and a Gathering 
 
 
It is 2018, and my Mom is living with my Dad in Tucson, AZ, solidly in the “advanced” 
stage of Alzheimer’s disease. My Mom sits down to the dining table wherever my Dad tells her 






my favorite food growing up, and I welcome the nostalgic meal during my visit to my parents in 
Tucson from my home in Pittsburgh. My Mom used to pack homemade burritos for me in my 
school lunches, and we’d eat them for dinner almost weekly. A casual food, we assembled them 
at the dining table from small bowls of toppings and ate them with our hands. Only now, my 
Mom eats hers with a knife and fork. She holds the silverware diligently, though with a gestural 
awkwardness that conveys that she is working through an experiment of how best to get the food 
to her mouth. She tries holding the fork between her thumb, index and middle fingers, then 
switches over to holding it in a fist. She saws the burrito with the dull knife, back and forth again 
and again, approaching her task tentatively. She seems to be aware she is doing something 
different than the rest of us, but perhaps is so consumed with the task at hand that the social 
awareness just lends an extra layer of stress rather than act as a clue to look at how my Dad and I 
were approaching the task. Maybe she has forgotten that burritos are normally eaten with hands, 
or maybe she hasn’t identified it as a burrito at all. That she opted for the fork and knife calls 
back to her social etiquette: she is following a general social norm of using utensils. As someone 
who grew up working class in a fishing town in Alaska and then became an upper class, glass-
shattering businesswoman, her social etiquette and defaulting toward something formal strikes 
me as a socially-conscious strategy, despite her tentative grip on the utensils.  
My Dad encourages her to pick the burrito up with her hands and try eating it that way. 
She darts her eyes at him playfully like he’s suggesting something absurd but notices his earnest 
expression and decides he is serious. She tries, very slowly, to pick up her burrito. It is a 
challenge to hold it so that the toppings don’t slide out the end, and again, she approaches this 
tentatively. She takes a bite and puts the burrito back on her plate. Everything that my Mom does 






finished our burritos, and we sit and talk at the table while my Mom continues eating. She 
switches back to using her utensils, and this time my Dad does not encourage her otherwise.  
Things Forget Her 
The things with which my Mom tethered herself to the world were shaking themselves 
free from the webbing of her being-field, including the missing word denoted with a colon in the 
note written by my Mom, pictured above, which reads: “there are several misplaced: please call 
my hose.” Eva Simms wrote of the worlding power of things: “things are deeply woven into the 
structures of the human body, and […] determine locations in the web of lived space” (Simms, 
2008, p. 82). When things pulled their threads from the webbing of my Mom’s lifeworld, she 
seemed to encounter them with more slack in the line, from farther away, and she worked to 
hone her focus on them with that much more energy, in an attempt to figure the thing out and to 
thwart the attentional demands of myriad other chaotic things in her sensorial reach. As things 
became untethered, missing things left an ellipsis and new things were gathered by emotional 
meaning. 
The fork in this vignette seemed to conceal from my Mom its utilitarian history. What 
once she handled fluently and without consideration, required incredible cognitive attention and 
experimentation to master. The fork did not disclose to her the way it used to fit into her hand; it 
became mysterious. Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote, “the things of the world are not simply 
neutral objects which stand before us for our contemplation. Each one of them symbolizes or 
recalls a particular way of behaving, provoking in us reactions which are either favorable or 
unfavorable” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, pp. 48, bold emphasis added). Memory is a reciprocal 






the chiasmic pathways of recollection are fragmented and begin to unwind, the things of the 
world can provoke reactions of frustration, desperation, and innovation.  
As my Mom lost mastery over the fork, the fork became more of a thing than an object; it 
regained its thingness and dislodged itself from my Mom’s field of mastery, and she was forced 
to contend with it anew. This distinction between “thing” and “object” may seem minute, but the 
meanings associated with these words are important to tease apart. I refer to “things” as having a 
kind of animacy, which David Abram argued characterizes how people “spontaneously 
experience them, prior to all our conceptualizations and definitions” (1996, p. 56). Things 
express themselves sensuously, act as “a dynamic presence that confronts us and draws us into 
relation” (Abram, 1996, p. 56). Objects, on the other hand, are experienced conceptually rather 
than sensuously; they are domesticated in a sense. There is a benefit to objectification: it makes it 
much easier to use an object as a tool to accomplish a task. Experiencing the sensuous presence 
of a fork makes the task of eating much slower and experimental. On the other hand, 
approaching the fork as an object which acts as an extension of the self to accomplish the task of 
eating with some fluidity means bypassing the sensuousness of the fork itself, perhaps to focus 
on the sensuous experience of the food the fork is carrying.  
In a neurotypical person, there is some degree of control and intension in how we may 
objectify things or encounter their thingness in a dynamic and animated reciprocal relationship, 
although this is highly mediated by culture. There is some intentionality behind allowing a piece 
of art “speak” to us, by quieting the analytical mind and opening the body to the perceptual field 
of the piece of art, allowing ourselves to receive and be impacted by the thing that we are 
engaging with our senses. In other situations, we can look at an animate landscape and imagine 






around us, for the most part, is animate. Air, water, land, not to mention mosquitos and moose 
and daffodils, are all animate. Switching between an objectifying and a relational mode of 
perception is not dependent on the things themselves but relates more to how a person orients 
within particular cultural norms.  
Indeed, US culture is one that values utilitarian objectification above the sensuous, 
relational perception that sees the animacy of things. We educate our children to be analytical 
thinkers who prioritize use-value and reward them when their default mode of perception is one 
of objectification. Socializing children into our society involves a steady insistence that they 
learn to be productive within a capitalist economy, which is reproduced through the processes of 
objectification and commodification. A relational way of perceiving involves recognizing the 
animacy of other beings and respects their autonomy within reciprocal connection. Relational 
perception is undervalued in the US and in many other cultures influenced by the logic of 
colonization and capitalism across the world; it is in direct opposition to the objectification that 
propels a capitalist economy forward. And as these systems have created the Anthropocene, an 
objectifying perception of the world is at the heart of what reproduces the era in which we have 
created the conditions for the annihilation of our own species. This is where the systems get 
under our skin, and our bodies and ways of perceiving become conduits for the larger systems of 
which we are a part.   
Robin Wall Kimmerer connects our economy with our language in her book, Braiding 
Sweetgrass: Indigenous wisdom, scientific knowledge, and the teachings of the plants (2013). 
She wrote that the capitalist economy, which is characterized by commodity exchange in which a 
person’s relationship to the seller and to the commodity is essentially limited to the moment of 






things as animate. Wall Kimmerer wrote: “English doesn’t give us many tools for incorporating 
respect for animacy. In English, you are either a human or a thing. Our grammar boxes us in by 
the choice of reducing a nonhuman being to an it, or it must be gendered, inappropriately, as a he 
or a she. Where are our words for the simple existence of another living being?” (2013, p. 56). 
Note that she uses the word “thing” here how I have defined the term “object” above. Kimmerer 
is situated biculturally and compares US culture with her Potawatomi indigenous culture, and her 
use of the word “thing” here helps illustrate that the English language has a poverty of animacy 
to it. Perhaps for some Western scholars like myself, the word “thing” is a step toward animacy 
from the word “objective,” but it is still a subdued gesture toward the animacy that lives in other, 
especially indigenous, languages.  
While Kimmerer especially emphasizes the deleterious impact the lack of animacy 
reflected in our language and our economy has on the rest of the living world, from mammals to 
insects to the rivers themselves, as we objectify and cause harm to these living beings and 
ecosystems, there is something still relevant here to inanimate objects like the fork my Mom was 
contending with in the previous vignette. The utilitarian or objectifying way of perceiving was 
not something my Mom could recall in that moment. It was like a horse whose saddle was taken 
off. The utensils seemed to have their own intentionality, as if the utensils themselves had 
forgotten how to obey my Mom’s will. Unwieldy reciprocity entered into the equation as my 
Mom fumbled with the utensils, seeming to be asking in her gentle and tentative gestures how 
the utensils might like to be involved in her project of eating a burrito. 
Importantly, this vignette intersects with how my Mom was perceived through a lens of 
pathology by medical professionals as well as others in her life, including myself. The result of 






and using a different method than what we perceive as “normal.” From the cultural vantage point 
of the US, and more specifically from the “anatomo-clinical gaze” (D. H. Davis, 2004, p. 370), 
my Mom’s engagement with the utensils in this vignette was indicative of her pathology. The 
“anatomo-clinical gaze” refers to a historically situated interpretation of illness: “a previous 
understanding of disease was as imbalances and disequilibria, contra the natural body, the gaze 
now revealed disease as residing within the natural body” (D. H. Davis, 2004, p. 370). This 
indicates the body is read as being ill, the person themself as abnormal, and is itself a form of 
objectification. The anatomo-clinical gaze can itself be seen as a symptom of the Anthropocene. 
And certainly, it was indicative of her deviation from the norm, including her own norm from 
years earlier in how she approached the task of eating. However, this is a deficit-focused 
interpretation that lacks any explanation about what her lived experience of using the utensils 
might have actually been. Although I can only offer these thoughts as a possibility, having only 
my own lived experience of being with my Mom during her experience of Alzheimer’s to draw 
on, they offer another perspective that may be less pathologizing, and which draw attention to the 
hegemony of our “hypercognitive” culture (Post, 2000), and its relation to the Anthropocene. 
What then, can our forgetful elders teach us about being, forgetting and dying in the 
Anthropocene? They can remind us of the animacy of the world around us, which we may have 
lost sight of (or never experienced in the first place) due to our socialization in political and 
economic systems which actively work against and encourage us to forget about being in the 
world in this way. The ways in which my Mom reminded me of the animacy of the world felt 








Chapter 4: Timeless Time and Moving Spirits 
Did you know your heart has a door?  
Did you know your heart is a hollowed-out conch shell, a swirling entryway, around into 
the safe center?  
Did you know your mama built the walls of your heart with her body?  
Did you know she used her spirit to build the pathway into your heart?  
Did you know she kept her spirit in your heart even after you were born?  
Like a sea anemone’s tentacle, she tethered her spirit to your heart.  
 
Six years ago, while running through the woods on Cougar Mountain, outside of Seattle, 
an overwhelming feeling of simultaneous ecstasy and crushing sorrow came over me as I sensed 
powerfully through my spirit. My Mom was beginning her transition away from this life, 
entering the liminal space between this world and the next, and I felt that transition physically 
through her spirit slipping out from my body. It was like an out of body experience, as if I were 
watching it happen from above the tree line, while I simultaneously felt totally embedded in the 
sensations in my body, which were all pleasurably humming in harmony as I glided through the 
woods. I knew: when she dies, a part of me will die, too; the part her that is in me. This 
revelation cut through my sense of past and future, and I felt as though I could run forever. 
Visions of My Grandparents 
A couple of years later, I again had a physical feeling in my chest of my Mom’s spirit 
receding from my body. I recognized the feeling from that time on Cougar Mountain, and I 
spoke with my therapist about it. She guided me through a journey, one of facilitating the 
receding of my Mom’s spirit from my heart: sending her spirit back to her with gratitude and a 
blessing, so that she may have all the energetic resources she needs for her transition. Working 
with the physical sensations of her receding energy from my chest, I escorted it, holding it with 
deep gratitude and love, and visualized sending it across space to where she was sitting in her 






vision took me to where she sat, I was astonished to see my Nana standing behind my Mom, 
braiding her hair. Then I saw her father there, who was her rock in life, a man I never met but 
whose spirit I have felt deeply connected to since I was a child. Crowding behind them were my 
Mom’s aunts and uncles, grandmothers, grandfathers, and other ancestors all fanning out in the 
room behind my Mom.  
I was stunned. My Mom had for over a year been talking about her parents as if they 
were still alive. She would ask me to be sure that they had gotten home okay, or that they had 
found some dinner to eat, lamenting that she could not cook for them that day. I encountered 
these conversations uncomfortably. I had learned the popular adage in communicating with 
people who have Alzheimer’s, a new philosophy in the field: validate whatever reality they share 
with you. And so, I would comfort my Mom, telling her that I had spoken with them and that 
they are home safely, cozy and warm. But when I told her those things, I experienced internally 
an incredible discord, and a horrible feeling of lying to my Mom, that left me questioning 
whether she could hear my deceit through my words. Furthermore, I felt like I was betraying my 
own reality to do so, in a way that felt violent to the validity of my own experience. I felt 
incredible conflict over this idea: do I negate my reality to join her in hers? Or do I negate her 
reality to hope to have her join mine? As her daughter, my sense of reality at its core is what she 
has validated for me over my lifetime. To have her join into my reality, to meet me where I was 
at, provided one of the most fundamental feelings of love and safety I have had access to in my 
lifetime. The stakes of this conundrum felt dire, and tormented me for over a year.  
And then: there they were. I saw them. I saw her parents there with her! Our realities met, 
and neither were neglected in that moment, despite being thousands of miles apart. I experienced 






are present with her, along with a whole host of other ancestors. Mom called them to be present, 
for they are her guides and her comforts in her long journey through the liminal space of 
Alzheimer’s, from this world to the next.  
Co-Existentiality 
The mother’s body is the first house of being, a shadowy and round abode for the 
unborn. A great paradox rules pregnancy: are there two bodies or one? Two 
beings or one?  
- Simms, 2008, p. 14  
 
My position of co-existentiality with my Mom is deeply woven into my being. My life 
started with hers, and the most basic contours of my sense of the world begin with how she wove 
me into existence inside her body. “The deep space of the womb is the first place in which the 
senses awaken” (Simms, 2008, pp. 30, italics in the original). The context of the experiences I 
described in “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits” is grounded in my co-existentiality with my 
Mom. Her embodied consciousness was an invitation into the world at the beginning of my life. 
At the end of her life, she invited me to experience another, more spiritual, world through my 
own embodied consciousness. 
Co-existentiality is a concept which indicates an inherent being-with; a fundamental 
permeability of my being with other beings, especially the particular beings you grew up with; it 
describes an ontological interdependence. It challenges the idea that a person is an isolated 
monad operating in a world of other isolated monads, where interaction is transactional between 
separate and whole individuals. As Simms indicated, co-existentiality describes that our 
perception of the world is immediately and necessarily constructed by our relational experiences 
with other beings; indeed, our sensory organs are developed in the context of our relational 






integration disorders, literally unable to perceive and sense the world appropriately (Simms, 
2008, p. 86). Likewise, researchers have “found that people who lived alone or who were no 
longer married were between 70% and 80% more likely to develop dementia than those who 
lived with others or who were married” (Gabbard, 2014, p. 391). Consciousness, perception, and 
memory are relational phenomena, and when we are removed from relational situations 
developmental delays or even atrophy can occur. Co-existentiality invites us into being. As this 
chapter seeks to uncover the theoretical underpinnings of the stories I related in the previous 
chapter about Timeless Time and Moving Spirits, I explore how my embodied consciousness 
was tethered, fundamentally, with that of my Mom’s.  
The concept of co-existentiality is remembered by Western feminist thinkers, recovered 
from a philosophical inheritance of Cartesian philosophy, and never forgotten in indigenous 
ways of knowing despite centuries of colonial repression, theft and genocide (Todd, 2016). 
Cartesian dualism covered over co-existentiality by identifying thinking with being, famously 
with the phrase, “I think, therefore I am.” Cartesian philosophy leaves no room for consciousness 
to be intertwined, bigger than the body of an individual person. The philosophical tradition of 
phenomenology began to recover a relational perspective, that being-in-the-world is 
fundamentally being in relationship with the world, and that our sensory organs weave us into 
the world, giving us a field of being that exceeds the boundary of our skin, but is nonetheless 
rooted in the body. Maurice Merleau-Ponty critiqued the Cartesian vision of scientific inquiry for 
attempting to be “an absolute observer who is equally close to them all, a medium without a 
point of view, without body and without spatial position - in sum, the medium of pure intellect” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 41).  






indeed, we live in it every day – there are complex philosophical understandings of embodiment 
that substantially effect the way we live. Maurice Merleau-Ponty understood embodiment as the 
seat of consciousness. He discussed ideas such as body schema, intentionality, and perception as 
the way in which we are directed toward the world through our embodiment. In the 
Phenomenology of Perception (2002), he proposed that our ability to perceive through our senses 
has led some–particularly in the history of Western philosophy–to believe that our bodies are 
objects, or that consciousness is essentially an activity of the mind that is independent of the 
body. He suggested that rather than being an object, the body exists as a being-toward-the-world. 
The concept of “body schema” is helpful in understanding this, as Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
described that our bodies move not by some calculated formula thought through in advance, but 
as a fluid, coherent yet permeable whole in the direction of our goals. “Intentionality” is a term 
that he used to describe that consciousness is not a cognitive process, but a process of our bodies 
moving toward the world; put in simpler terms, he said: “consciousness is originarily [sic] not an 
‘I think that,’ but rather an ‘I can’” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 139). Our embodiment in the world 
is where consciousness arises, not the mind as a separate thing from the body, and it arises 
through engaging with the world. His concept of embodied consciousness deconstructs the 
binary of mind/body. While thinking, experienced as an internal monologue, may be understood 
as another type of consciousness, Merleau-Ponty argued that our more fundamental level of 
existence from which all else arises is our embodied consciousness.  
Embodied consciousness arises in interaction with the world around it, as this has deep 
implications for understanding being-in-the-world. When we return to the body as the seat of 
consciousness, we return also to the lived history of that body, as a body who was born out of 






toward the world within the harbor of a relational field. The body schema is not just an 
experience of the body, but of the body in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2002). In his essay, “The 
Intertwining–The Chiasm,” Merleau-Ponty (1968) described how embodied consciousness is 
chiasmically woven into the world, as our senses are shaped by what we perceive, and vice 
versa. What we perceive is shaped by our sensing it, such that the seer and the visible become 
indistinguishable from one another in their reciprocal structure (Merleau-Ponty, 1968). The 
space between seer and the visible is what Merleau-Ponty described as “flesh,” the alive, 
reciprocal contact that is the “means of communication” between seer and the visible (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968, p. 135). I think of his idea of “flesh” as a way of indicating that the relational field 
is animate and is life-giving and consciousness-fostering. It is the field that we are neither 
completely enveloped in nor separate from; it is the co-existential framework of our becoming. 
Indeed, Eva Simms (2008) wrote in conversation with Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on 
embodiment that cognitive thinking is a capacity that develops throughout early childhood, and 
infants experience an immersion in their bodily perceptions that is unmediated by cognition, such 
that an infant is “not merely in the world but is the world” (p. 22). She continued, noting that 
adults typically experience some awareness of the difference between themselves and the world 
they’re immersed in, but nonetheless are bodily immersed in the world. It is as if cognition 
mediates our being-world. In the structure of the phrase, “being-in-the-world,” we might 
understand “in-the” to be the work of cognition. Chiasmically interwoven, Merleau-Ponty wrote, 
“we are the world that thinks itself […] the world is at the heart of our flesh” (1968, p. 136).  
Observing the developmental trajectory of infants and young children reveals a particular 
ontological organization; one that is interdependent. Pregnancy is perhaps the most tangible 






phenomenological thinkers that critique Cartesianism, such as Merleau-Ponty, fail to fully 
articulate co-existentiality (Young, 2005, p. 47). The concept upends the post-enlightenment 
philosophy that articulates a form of individualism that has informed the socioeconomic 
structures, political ideology, and framework of ethics in the West for hundreds of years. Iris 
Marion Young wrote: “pregnancy challenges the integration of my body experience by rendering 
fluid the boundary between what is within, myself, and what is outside, separate. I experience 
my insides as the space of another, yet my own body” (2005, p. 49). Pregnancy is only a very 
tangible and literal example, which Simms expands upon by describing the co-existentiality of 
infants with their caregivers, especially through breastfeeding. She wrote: “Milk reveals to us 
that the body, even in its organic dimension, is not enclosed in itself but is engaged in a 
meaningful web of relations. […] Perhaps more than any other substance milk is the visible sign 
of the invisible, the in-between body, the chiasm, the flesh of mother and infant” (Simms, 2008, 
p. 15). In the stories related in “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits,” there is a folding over of my 
Mom’s consciousness into my own in which a meaningful web of relations from her embodied 
memory, and her inherited embodied memories, were revealed.  
Embodied consciousness does not exist cut off from the past or future, in some kind of 
stark series of disconnected present moments. Rather, there is a flow from moment to moment, 
where the preceding moment is not forgotten, but is integrated into the present. Embodied 
consciousness involves a gathering up of time, as a being-toward-the-world is also a movement 
toward a future. Merleau-Ponty described that the body inhabits time and space (2002, pp.140-
141). That is, space and time are not the coordinates in which we are abstractly located, but it is 
though time and space that embodied consciousness exists at all. Embodied memory therefore is 






cognitive, memory as a kind of projection from the present into the past (Fuchs, 2012), I would 
argue that even our explicit memories (such as recalling the name of an old friend) are actually 
embodied, and are experienced bodily as a kind of “time travel,” where explicit memories can 
wash over us and conjure again the sensations of all that is tethered to that cognitive association. 
Paul Ricoeur (2004) suggested that because human experience is not limited to cognition, 
neither is memory. If embodied consciousness is about the body in relation to the world, the 
same must be true of embodied memory. Embodied memory is our “lived past,” in which the 
body’s experiences, “anchored in body memory, spread out and connect with the environment 
like an invisible network, which relates us to things and to people” (Fuchs, 2012, p. 11). The 
body is permeable to the world in which it lives, and memory mediates that permeability, 
tethering us to places and other beings with whom we are bonded, anchoring our identity and 
providing a springboard for our actions. Edward Casey wrote that to remember “is to become 
enmeshed in the thicket of the past,” which he argues supports being an “autonomous agent in 
the world,” as an act of recognizing loved ones “consolidates social bonds that empower me in 
various ways” (Casey, 2009, p. 548). Here, autonomy may best be interpreted to mean the ability 
to act free from coercion – not independently, but interdependently. Indeed, it is our 
interdependence that makes autonomous action possible, a fact that is often covered over in our 
hyper-individualistic culture, another symptom of the Anthropocene.  
This is clarified with a reflection on our lived experience: memories sometimes seem to 
occur randomly to us, but more often than not they are conjured by some stimulus in our 
environment. When I see an old friend, memories of times past and the ease in my body I 
immediately feel with her offer themselves over to me without conscious effort on my part. 






The world holds our memories, and it is our chiasmic interwovenness with the world where 
memories are offered over to us. Memory is not simply an activity of the brain, though the brain, 
being an organ that is highly responsive to the environment, is involved. I would argue rather 
that memory is made possible because of our chiasmic relation to the world. There is a reciprocal 
exchange of embodied memory between the world and us.  
Although intersubjectivity may be a part of our being-in-the-world, I believe it goes 
beyond the dyadic structure of person-to-person that the word “intersubjectivity” suggests, but 
rather encompasses a world. Merleau-Ponty’s description of being the world and the world being 
us may be a radical departure within Western philosophy, but resonates deeply with many 
indigenous epistemologies across the world (Todd, 2016; Kimmerer, 2013). This sociohistorical 
philosophical comparison is an important indicator of what colonizing cultures may forget in 
their move to dominate and extract, including such epistemologies in the first place, which were 
partially recovered by Merleau-Ponty (with help from his predecessors like Husserl and 
Heidegger) only by thinking through embodiment.  
Cultural Ways of Knowing 
Indeed, while Merleau-Ponty beautifully describes the embodied consciousness that is 
born out of our movement toward and chiasmic reciprocity with the world, he does little to 
interpret the specificity of the sociocultural world with which we are in reciprocal relationship. It 
is worth looking at memory from another side: the sociocultural and ecological specificity of the 
world we are woven into. Culture is a kind of intergenerational collective memory system. We 
pass down knowledge from one generation to the next through culture, and our memories of how 
we have survived become the map for the future generation to live from. Some of this is the 






the “habitus.” Examining the sociocultural context by way of embodiment can be helped along 
by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) concept of “habitus,” which addresses how our bodily practices are 
influenced by the cultures in which we are socialized. Habitus describes an embodied, pre-
reflective dimension of our existence which originates in the culture (Csordas, 2015). Habitus 
explains the harmony of cultural dispositions among groups of people without people 
consciously referring back to a norm – these are the cultural norms that we embody without 
needing to think about it (Kontos, 2004). My own habitus may explain why I anticipate that the 
stories related in “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits” will not be readily understood by people 
situated in my cultural background, and why I am going to great lengths to explore what makes it 
real. My cultural habitus does not have a framework to make sense of this kind of experience.  
Our relationship to culture is fundamentally facilitated with communication, including 
language, behavior and aesthetics. David Abram (1996) described the history of the modern 
alphabet and traces how language used to be born out of a reciprocal interaction with the natural 
world (e.g. pictorial signs, onomatopoetic words whose sounds mimicked the natural world), but 
evolved such that languages that use the Latin alphabet refer only to human-made signs, making 
the more-than-human world mostly excluded from our semiotic system. Robin Wall Kimmerer 
suggested that this exclusion is evident in our grammar, which reflects how we culturally 
structure relationships. She notes that the English language is comprised of only about 30% 
verbs, whereas her native language, Potawatomi, is about 70% verbs (Kimmerer, 2013). This is 
important because verbs refer to a kind of embodied consciousness, a doing, rather than a static, 
disembodied “thing.” She described that in Potawatomi, the word “bay,” a noun in English, 
would be translated as “to be a bay,” such that the water is linguistically represented, and 






sociocultural memory and structures our relationships with the human and non-human world 
around us. 
When I tell the stories in “Timeless Time and Moving Spirits,” I anticipate that my 
audience (Western, academic, and likely disproportionately made up of white settlers due to the 
white supremacy that shapes Western academic communities) will hear this as a dream at best or 
a delusion at worst, or perhaps a failure of my perception, because our culture, our language, our 
ways of knowing, do not interpret these kinds of experiences as animate, real, and spiritual. 
What happens when our culture asks us to forget about our bodies and see the natural 
world as a commodity, as does our capitalist socioeconomic system in the era of the 
Anthropocene, where the needs of our bodies get in the way of the further production of capital 
(Federici, 2018)? When the culture asks us to deny our interconnectedness with one another and 
with the world? To deny the reality of our being-in-the-world, our being-world at all? Andy 
Fisher (2013), writing from a phenomenological ecopsychological perspective, said that it is this 
alienation from–or forgetting of–our bodies that replaces our bodily based perception of our own 
existence with an intellectual, fantasy-based one that we conceptualize as monologues taking 
place in our heads, i.e., Cartesian ways of knowing. Part of what can happen is the loss of a felt 
sense of being interdependent, of being permeable to other beings and to places.   
It is not as if my Mom transported me through an interdimensional portal like what might 
be depicted in a sci-fi film. Something more mundane and literal happened, though it still felt 
like a radical departure from how I perceived the world before that experience. It may seem 
radical to trust the perception of people living with Alzheimer’s all the time. But when I could be 
trustworthy to my Mom – when I improvised along with her perception, stayed with her in 






ancestors was the most profound, and was one that altered my cosmology. Before that 
experience, I did not have an experiential relationship with my ancestors; a new spatiotemporal 
world opened to me. Simms wrote, “The early anchorage in maternal space remains a keystone 
in the depth of our spatial experience in general”(2008, p. 34). In my experience of being with 
my Mom while she had Alzheimer’s, she opened up a new spatial experience to me: a spiritual 
space. In so doing, she reminded me of my belonging to a lineage of ancestors who will have my 







Chapter 5: Memories of Horizon 
The landscape surrounding my parents’ townhouse spans the spectrum from untouched 
desert to meticulously manicured golf course and all the range in between, of concrete, adobe 
style cookie-cutter townhouses with uniquely chosen desert flora landscaped to match the 
preference of each homeowner. My parents began visiting Tucson years ago, when my Mom 
could still drive, when she only had “chemo brain farts,” which were concerning, but seemed 
within the range of normal behavior for someone her age who had endured years of 
chemotherapy for breast cancer. My parents loved visiting the desert, and in 2016 they finally 
moved there, selling their house in Portland, OR. The desert was a new environment for my 
Mom, one that she did not live in until after she had Alzheimer’s.  
My Mom sat on the couch in the living room of their townhouse for much of her waking 
day. Her body adapted to the shape of the overstuffed cushions, which hugged her back side and 
reflected her warmth comfortably back onto her skin. From the couch, she did not need to survey 
the back of her body for threat from the unfamiliar world in which she dwelled: it was protected, 
even as her long sits kept her knees from articulating and lubricating, so they sounded like 
crackling logs in a fire when she stood. The couch was a safe and comforting place, where she 
was often joined by her dog, a loyal little white fluffball of a companion who she named after her 
father, Jasper. The couch was a respite from the increasingly unwieldy and unfamiliar 
townhouse. Their townhouse had an open floor plan, so the large living room opened to the 
dining room and entryway and looked out on the back patio. It was a lot of space for her to keep 
track of at once, and she rediscovered where the hallway led every time she journeyed down it. 
What lay beyond her line of sight became unknown, and she filled in the gaps of her memory of 






looking for the set of stairs that could take her up to her bedroom. Only, in their one-story 
townhouse, there were no stairs, a choice my parents made together when they considered where 
they would like to live as they became less mobile as they aged. 
I recall a visit to Tucson to visit my parents. My Mom looked out the window of their 
townhouse at the cacti in their back patio and the great blue skies of southern Arizona. She saw 
this horizon, but located herself “up North, with my Dad.” My best guess as to what she meant 
by “up North” was near where her parents retired and her father died in 1983, on Camano Island, 
Washington. It is a forested coastal area where the sky is overcast most days of the year and 
you’re never too far from the Puget Sound. Or perhaps she was locating herself further North and 
further back in time to Ketchikan, Alaska, where she grew up amidst the eagles and salmon and 
rain. Her father was a fisherman there and the stories my Mom would tell cast him as a 
community leader, a barrel-chested generous mischief-maker, who woke her up on the weekends 
by pounding out blues songs on the piano. 
Although sometimes my Mom would look out at the desert and conjure some other, far 
away horizon in her minds-eye, other times she would look out at the golds and reds of Southern 
Arizona like a painter. One time she described the sunset to me, looking out on the eastern face 
of Pusch Ridge, part of the Santa Catalina mountain range visible from their townhouse in 
Tucson: “the mountains go pink, purple.” Something in how she said this – her grammar, but 
also her tone – brought the mountains to life. I felt like I was looking at the rounded backs of 
giant huddled animals transforming their flesh like chameleons in the magic of the dusk.  
Recollection and Dwelling  






consciousness. Emmanuel Levinas wrote in Totality and Infinity (1969) that recollection is “a 
suspension of the immediate reactions the world solicits in view of a greater attention to oneself, 
one’s possibilities, and the situation” (p. 154). Recollection establishes the “I,” meaning that 
“familiarity [a mode of recollection] is an accomplishment, an en-ergy of separation. With it 
separation is constituted as dwelling and inhabitation. To exist henceforth means to dwell.” (pp. 
155-156). Dwelling therefore entails both a separation from the world and an immersion or 
reinsertion within it as a self-conscious being that is made possible through memory.   
This process of individual recollection is mirrored collectively, as Simms wrote, “In the 
history of human cultures, the founding of a place lies in its differentiation from the 
undifferentiated ‘chaos’ around it, which thus establishes a point of orientation and an ordered 
world of here and there” (2008, p. 31). Recollection, on both an individual and collective basis, 
is a process of drawing a line that establishes the boundary between here and there, me and not-
me. “The separation that is concretized through the intimacy of the dwelling outlines new 
relations with the elements” (Levinas, 1969, p. 156). Memory makes dwelling possible by 
maintaining a separation of the self from the not-self, like individual threads preserved in a 
woven tapestry. Memory provides the space to sense that distinction, and thus the space to 
approach and weave into the field of being, even as memory is made possible by “living from” a 
place (Levinas, 1969, p. 153). To stand on the earth and to stand in oneself simultaneously is the 
ambiguity of embodiment, and memory maintains that ambiguity. Memory is the dashes that 
connect and separate each element of “being-in-the-world.” It bears repeating: “To exist 
henceforth means to dwell” (Levinas, 1969, p. 156).  
In Western culture, memories are typically described as being “located” inside the brain 






locate the phenomenon of memory instead in the field of being, beyond the skin of the 
individual. Memory as such is comprised of the chiasmic threads that weave a person to her 
being-field, housed in and recalled through the matrix of places, people and things themselves. 
Memory dwells not in an “interior consciousness,” but is rather the threading that both separates 
and situates a person within the field of places, people and things they are surrounded by and 
which they gather into a configuration of identity. Dwelling therefore is an act of collecting 
again, re-collecting, the pulse of the world, which vibrates through the being who is held separate 
from and simultaneously situated within the world with memory. 
Specific memories gather a concretized self. A self who has a history, particular likes and 
dislikes, particular identities, ideologies, and attachments. However, while specific memories are 
totalized concretizations of things that happened in a past chronological time, the faculty of 
memory is the thread that weaves us into the field of being. Recollection is the tethering that 
dwells us in the world.  
Dwelling in Alzheimer’s, Alzheimer’s Embodied 
What happens to a person who is losing her memory, if dwelling is an act of recollection? 
She becomes unwound from the world, in a sense; the apparent exterior here-and-now may not 
match the interior experience of here-and-now. In the vignette at the start of this chapter, my 
Mom was physically located in Tucson, and yet she felt as if she were “up North,” in a very 
different landscape. This dwelling elsewhere resulted in fissures in a shared lifeworld with the 
people around her, even while her embodied selfhood persisted (Kontos, 2012). My Mom 
continued to dwell, but the world she located herself within was not always in the here-and-now 






My Mom sought comforting spaces as her secure position in the webbing of time and 
place loosened with the progression of her disease. Her experience of furniture, rooms and 
horizons changed as a result. “In a very general way, the key problem of dementia might be 
described as the loss of a common shared world of meaning, that is, the loss of a common home” 
(Dekkers, 2011, p. 292). If she was losing her place in a “common” home, what was she 
experiencing instead? She negotiated a novel world from the compass of her embodied 
memories, which became dislodged from their specific positions in the chronological and spatial 
history of her life. It must be underscored though that her dwelling in another world, different 
from the one experienced by the people around her, was nevertheless a shared lifeworld, a 
common home with other beings, most notably her parents, who she often discussed. As the 
world around her began to feel unfamiliar, she located herself in another home. 
Cradle and Comfort 
The home, as a building, belongs to a world of objects. But this belongingness 
does not nullify the bearing of the fact that every consideration of objects, and of 
buildings too, is produced out of a dwelling.  
-Levinas, 1969, pp. 152-153 
The place my Mom was in did not adhere to her cognitive schema of her present location. 
When my Mom was searching for the stairs to her bedroom in her single-story home, her 
embodied memory knew how to get her to a comforting resting place, only the floorplan of their 
current home did not match that memory, which arose out of another time and place. Gaston 
Bachelard wrote:  
But over and beyond our memories, the house we were born in is physically inscribed in 
us. It is a group of organic habits. After twenty years, in spite of all the other anonymous 






on that rather high step. The house’s entire being would open up, faithful to our own 
being. (1964, 36). 
The stairs up to her bedroom, the threshold to where the demands of her waking world could be 
temporarily released, were inscribed in my Mom’s body, and she navigated from that felt 
compass. She looked again for that threshold, but it took a different and unfamiliar form in this 
home, one which she had not been able to incorporate into her embodied schema to recall again 
as needed. And so, recollection failed her, and the house in which she lived closed off its 
homeliness to her, retracting its hospitable welcome.  
My Mom knew, in this example, what function she was looking for: she wanted to find a 
place to rest. However, the form of her home did not feel familiar, so she could not trace along 
the contours of her house to find her way back to the function she sought. The phenomenological 
philosopher of ecology, David Abram, wrote: “The body itself is a kind of place—not a solid 
object but a terrain through which things pass, and in which they sometimes settle and sediment” 
(Abram, 2011, p. 230). The terrain of my Mom’s embodied consciousness had begun to sift free 
those things which had settled, dislodging them from their familiar configurations. 
Dwelling with Alzheimer’s 
For my Mom, the outside world shuffled, and the horizon she gazed upon could be any 
number of horizons from her past. The horizon seemed to be conjured by my Mom’s emotional 
stirrings: what felt emotionally relevant was where she felt she resided in space. My Mom’s 
tendency to replace the horizon she was looking out at with a meaningful one from her past made 
sense as she tried to answer the question: where am I? She answered based on where she felt it 
was likely she was, based on where her heart had most been called. The time that she spent 






emotional magnitude. Her parents retired on Camano Island, and only lived there for a few years, 
during which time she gave birth to her first child, my older brother, Steve. Six months later, her 
father died from pancreatic cancer, an hour after my Mom promised him that she would take care 
of her mother, who was showing signs of developing Alzheimer’s herself.  
As her memory of the horizon became conceptually disorganized, my Mom compensated 
with poetry to tie together the disintegrating schemas of her cognition. As a result, she 
experienced and invited others around her to feel again “the birth of the landscape,” or “the feel 
of perceptual experience itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 41). When she said, “the mountains go 
pink, purple,” rather than organizing her description from an analytical schema where the 
mountains receive the effect of the setting sun, and the origin of change is the sun going below 
the horizon, she described how the mountains themselves transform. The specificity of the 
mountains, separate from the sunset, animated them, dancing apart from their adherence to the 
landscape. Bachelard describes that poetic imagery precedes thought and instead arises from the 
soul: ‘‘To specify exactly what a phenomenology of the image can be, to specify that the image 
comes before thought, we should have to say that poetry, rather than being a phenomenology of 
the mind, is a phenomenology of the soul.” (1994, p. 4). My Mom’s soul recognized the vitality 
of the changing mountains. Through my Mom’s poetic gesturing toward the landscape, she 
restored the earth with a mystical, alive quality that has often been stripped from it with the 
Western perspective of scientific objectivism. David Abram wrote: “The body is […] a sensitive 
threshold through which the world experiences itself, a traveling doorway through which sundry 
aspects of the earth are always flowing” (2010, p. 230). My Mom’s embodied experience of the 






as alive. She also shared that animacy of the earth with the people around her, including me, 
giving me a sense of enchantment with the landscape. 
Would the experience of place become as dislodged in a person who had been embedded 
within a single landscape during their lifetime? I wondered whether the fact that my Mom had 
moved so many times to such different landscapes over the course of her life influenced her 
experiences of the horizon in Tucson. Moving between such varied landscapes of Alaska, 
Washington, Oregon, and Arizona was available to my Mom because of her upward class 
mobility throughout her lifetime. But for many people in other cultural and socioeconomic 
locations, they might live with the same horizon for their whole lives. Although my parents 
enjoyed the warmth of the desert and chose to live there, it is possible that their moves to 
different landscapes provoked more disorientation for my Mom as she had Alzheimer’s. 
Connection to place can invoke a feeling of belonging whereby one can “feel at home”; it is “a 
landscape of memory, thought and imagination” (hooks, 2009, p. 221). As Yi-Fu Tuan argued, 
we strengthen our sense of self by accessing our imaginative and material past; objects anchor 
time, and place, though shifting, allows us to recapture our personal history (1977, p. 187). As 
my Mom faced insecurity about her sense of self in a place she had only lived in with 
Alzheimer’s—that is, a place she struggled to create new memories of belonging to due to the 
disease making it difficult to consolidate new memories in general—she found a strengthened 
sense of self in her memories of other places to which she used to feel a sense of belonging.   
Finding belonging in a shifting horizon is an ontological skill that will serve us well as 
we navigate the climate crisis of the Anthropocene. As the places we dwell in and are attached to 
undergo increasingly rapid changes in flora and fauna, including more frequent and intense 






home when the world around us feels unfamiliar will be crucial for our survival. Our most 
forgetful elders show us that even when profoundly disoriented, it is possible to anchor into a felt 









Chapter 6: Take Me on a Long Walk off a Short Dock 
My Mom’s mother, who my brother and I called Nana, had Alzheimer’s, too. She 
eventually died from the disease when I was 10 years old, and I don’t have any memory of Nana 
without Alzheimer’s – that was how I always knew her. My Mom was Nana’s primary caretaker, 
as her father died from cancer very early on in the course of Nana’s illness, and my Mom was an 
only child. My Mom tried to preserve her mother’s independence for as long as possible, and 
Nana lived in her own house in our neighborhood when I was a little girl. My Mom would cook 
for her and do her laundry, on top of having two small children and a demanding job. When we 
would visit Nana at her house, my Mom would enlist me to crawl under the bed and recover the 
silverware and other trinkets that Nana would hide there. She thought that people were trying to 
steal her belongings, so she would hide them under the bed, between the couch cushions, and in 
other unexpected nooks and crannies throughout her home. I took pleasure in searching for these 
things; it was a scavenger hunt that was helpful to my Mom.  
After a small fire in Nana’s house when she forgot to turn the stove off, my parents 
moved Nana into our house. I was young, and I don’t have many memories from the time when 
she lived with us. After a while, my parents moved Nana into an assisted living home in a suburb 
of Seattle. Despite being able to afford their laundry services, my Mom elected to continue doing 
her laundry every week, as a way to stay in relationship and regular contact despite the long 
drive. Naturally, my Mom felt ambivalence about visiting Nana; it was painful. Doing her 
laundry kept her accountable to making frequent visits. It wore my Mom out.  
My memories of Nana are mostly of visiting her at the assisted living home. I didn’t like 
going there, but I liked spending time with my Mom on the drive. Nana lived in the locked 






door. The place smelled like canned green beans, stale humidity and baby powder. Sometimes I 
would breathe through my mouth while I was there to avoid smelling it. Nana didn’t talk much, 
and when she did, it was difficult to follow, her words trailing off, falling in a pile off to the side. 
I could sense that she was confused, and sometimes irritated or upset, but she couldn’t explain 
why. As a young child, I couldn’t understand why she might have felt those things. I feared her 
cloudy and upset affect. Sometimes, though, I would sit near Nana and we would lock eyes, and 
it would feel like we were connected. Her eyes could smile and love deeply, even after her 
language stopped making much sense. Nana died in 1998. I remember my Mom getting a call 
that Nana had had a grand mal seizure. In my young mind, I imagined a hurricane sweeping 
through the inside of her body. She died the next day.  
My Mom was a daddy’s girl - her father was her hero, and his death from cancer in 1983 
was devastating to her, especially because he died 6 months after she gave birth to her first child, 
my older brother. On his death bed, my Mom promised her father that she would take care of his 
wife. My Mom upheld that promise, but taking care of Nana was hard. I think it was a 
combination of the particular ambiguous grief of losing someone to Alzheimer’s, and that my 
Mom was expected to (and expected herself to) do it all–glass ceiling-shattering career and all 
the reproductive labor of taking care of a family and a home. Those years were overwhelming to 
my Mom.  
Underlying all the exhaustion, I think my Mom felt fear. On a gut level, my Mom feared 
the possible future of getting Alzheimer’s herself. Looking at her mother was like looking at her 
own worst fears of what could happen to her. The fear was visceral. She never expressed it in a 
vulnerable or confessional way to me, but she told us hundreds of times over the years: “if I ever 






herself. She practically made us promise her that we would take her to a dock and throw her in if 
we had to. Although she would say it somewhat tongue-in-cheek, it was never entirely a joke. 
Sometimes difficult truths can only be joked about.  
I wish I knew what in particular made her say that. Was it her fear of not recognizing us? 
Of being dependent on others? Of requiring lots of time and money for care? Of not being a 
“productive member of society”? Of losing her identity as a woman in charge, both at work and 
at home? Was it her grief about her Mom expressing itself in the language of fear? All of these 
things combined? Something entirely different? She shared this refrain enough that when my 
Mom finally was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease herself, it loomed in the back of all our 
minds.  
How it loomed in my mind was amplified by the context of my own life at the time when 
my Mom was diagnosed. I was working as an end-of-life doula for two years, assisting a man 
named Mark, who had ALS, with all aspects of his dying process. I was intimate with death in 
those years. On April 20, 2015, Mark ended his life using physician assisted dying. I sat with 
him and his wife that day, as he administered a lethal dose of medication through his feeding 
tube. It was profoundly sad, as any death of a loved one is. But his death was marked with his 
autonomy, and I believe that it was an empowering decision for him to make in the face of the 
loss of control of every muscle in his body, including his diaphragm. He would have died before 
too much longer, in a much more terrifying way, most likely by choking, as swallowing even his 
own spit became nearly impossible.  
In what I can only describe as an experience of the Universe laughing mirthfully, within 
30 minutes of Mark dying, while I was beginning to make calls to his loved ones to let them 






inpatient geriatric psychiatric ward. In the months leading up to Mark’s death, my Mom began to 
experience a phenomenon known as Capgras Syndrome. It is a relatively rare phenomenon in 
which a person believes that those they are closest to are imposters. It happens most often in 
people with neurocognitive disorders or traumatic brain injuries. She had been experiencing this 
with my Dad; she thought that someone who looked like my Dad had assumed his identity and 
was lying about who he really was. My Mom was terrified about this, naturally, and she tried to 
defend herself, sometimes by hitting him. Although my Dad was stronger than my Mom, the 
situation was unsafe for both of them, and eventually after a particularly intense day of this, my 
Dad called 911. The paramedics took her to a psychiatric hospital. It just happened to be the 
same day, the same hour, that Mark died. That was the day that my Mom was officially 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.  
And so my Mom’s insistence over the years that my family take her on a long walk off a 
short dock if she ever got Alzheimer’s registered to me in a new light. The ethics, of course, 
were different with my Mom at this point, because unlike with Mark, it was unclear whether she 
would be able to fully understand the implications of physician assisted dying. Not to mention 
that it is illegal in the United States for people who have any kind of dementia. But over time, it 
became something that I regretted not talking with my Mom about earlier in her journey, when it 
may not have been legal, but it may have been ethical for her to consider seriously for herself. 
She wouldn’t have been the first person to make such a decision, facing a diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s. The fear of that emotional confrontation, and the taboo of the subject, held me back 
from broaching the subject with her. I don’t know for sure, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the 
same things held her back from bringing it up when she was in the early stages of the disease.  






the New York Times about a feminist psychologist named Sandra Bem. She had been diagnosed 
with Alzheimer’s, and decided to end her life before the disease did. The article detailed how she 
timed the end of her life to be in the “sweet spot” to maximize the length of her life, but to 
administer the lethal medication before she lost her ability to clearly comprehend what the 
implications would be (Henig, 2015). Because it was not legally sanctioned by any Death with 
Dignity laws in the US, Sandy Bem’s death was considered suicide. Part of what moved me 
about that article was the sense of joy and agency that Sandy seemed to possess about her 
decision. The conversation was out in the open.  
Late into my Mom’s disease, my Dad and I confided in one another about the moral 
quandary we felt about this. We both knew that she never wanted to live this way. She told us 
again, and again, and again before she ever got sick. This question didn’t just animate the 
hypothetical of physician assisted dying, which we both knew was out of the question due to her 
inability by then to participate in informed consent. Rather, it showed up in increasingly subtle 
ways as we made choices about prolonging her life. Should she continue taking medication 
intended to slow the progression of Alzheimer’s, knowing that it might add 6 more months to her 
life? Would those 6 months be a gift or a burden to her at this point?  
When we try to honestly represent her wishes, do we remember her wishes from before 
she had Alzheimer’s? Or do we try to understand what those wishes might be in the present? 
And if we try to understand what those wishes might be now, how do we do that? By the time 
my Dad, brother and I started to talk about this openly, my Mom struggled to participate in 
conversations at all. We could not ask her directly by then. All we could do was try to assess the 
quality of her life, balancing her past wishes with our sense of her experience in the present.  






coloring in her coloring book. Every night, my Dad and her would sit on their patio with a glass 
of wine (in my Mom’s cup, dealcoholized wine, as alcohol made her disoriented and agitated) 
and watch the sunset. There was joy in her life, moments of pleasure, and moments of 
connection. Was it joy she would choose for herself?  
Physician Assisted Dying 
This story about my Mom demanding that we take her on a long walk off a short dock 
elicits multiple theoretical threads worthy of inquiry. Of course, the issue of Physician Assisted 
Dying (PAD) is the subject of an ethical and cultural battleground in the United States and in 
many places around the world. In the US, there are 8 states plus the District of Columbia where 
PAD is legal as of 2020, however all of those places exclude people with Alzheimer’s disease 
and other dementias from using this kind of care. Under the structure of current laws, the simple 
reason for this is that a doctor must determine that a person has less than 6 months to live in 
order for them to prescribe life-ending medication, and by the time a person with Alzheimer’s is 
likely to be within 6 months of their death, they would no longer be able to provide consent due 
to the cognitive declines typical of the disease in the late stages. For people with Alzheimer’s 
disease, there is fundamentally an issue of timing when it comes to being excluded from legal 
access to PAD. How did PAD come to have the timeline around 6 months before a natural death? 
And how did PAD come to be a phenomenon to begin with? Cheryl Mwaria wrote that culture 
plays a significant role in physician assisted dying, and that “focusing as it does on the 
individual, our current approach to death seems to presume culture is irrelevant. Nothing, 
however, couple be further from the truth” (Mwaria, 1997, p. 862). What I aim to unpack here is 






Alzheimer’s are excluded from it.  
Physician-Assisted Dying is a Cultural Artifact 
Michael Cole described that the first basic principle of cultural-historical psychology is 
that people mediate their interactions with the world and one another through artifacts (Cole, 
1996, p. 108). The definition of “artifact” should be taken broadly, to include material, 
ideological, and other types of things like language. Importantly, artifacts are not only tools that 
do something to the world, they also do something to the user of the artifact: “every human being 
has her or his subjectivity and mental life altered through the process of seizing meanings and 
resources from some sociocultural environment and using them” (Shweder, 1990, p. 2). 
Conceptualizing PAD as a cultural artifact situates it into a cultural-historical framework of 
meaning, where it “accomplishes” more than simply the death of a person. 
To begin to see PAD as a cultural artifact, it is helpful to distinguish it from other forms 
of death, including other forms of suicide, and even from suicides of someone experiencing a 
terminal illness or extreme old age who uses another method, such as refusing treatment or 
electing to stop eating food or drinking water. PAD describes something very specific, and the 
Death with Dignity organization, which has advocated for the legalization of PAD in states 
around the United States, describes eligibility to use PAD as such:  
To qualify under Death with Dignity statutes, you must be an adult resident of a 
state where such a law is in effect; mentally competent, i.e. capable of making and 
communicating your healthcare decisions; and diagnosed with a terminal illness 
that will lead to death within six months, as confirmed by two physicians. The 
process entails two oral requests, one written request, waiting periods, and other 






If a person fits all of those eligibility requirements, they will be prescribed a lethal dose of 
medication, though what exactly is prescribed varies by medical provider.  
The language used to describe PAD is extremely specific, and controversial, and adds a 
layer to how the literal use of PAD gets taken up in our cultural imagination. Death with Dignity, 
an advocacy organization working to legalize PAD in more states in the US, notes on its website 
that they prefer to call PAD “death with dignity,” but that other acceptable terms include 
“physician-assisted death, physician-assisted dying, physician-hastened death/dying, aid in 
dying, physician aid in dying, and medical aid in dying” (Death With Dignity, n.d.). They carry 
on, noting that “Incorrect and inaccurate terms that opponents of physician-assisted dying use in 
order to mislead the public include: ‘assisted suicide,’ ‘doctor-assisted suicide,’ ‘physician-
assisted suicide’, and (active) ‘euthanasia’” (Death With Dignity, n.d.). It is worth noting that 
while physician-assisted suicide is merely a different name for the same thing as PAD, 
euthanasia is actually a slightly different act with important connotations. The European 
Association of Palliative Care defines euthanasia as what happens when “a doctor intentionally 
kills a person by the administration of drugs,” while PAD is when “a doctor helps a person to 
commit suicide by providing drugs for self-administration” (Materstvedt et al., 2003). The 
terminology with which we describe PAD impacts how we understand the act, and the 
connotation with or distancing from “suicide” is key in understanding what role(s) PAD plays on 
a cultural level. This brings up questions of the culturally specific meanings and connotations 
with the term “suicide,” which both sides of the debate use as a negative, taboo term. PAD does 
not attempt to undo the taboo of suicide; rather, it attempts to distinguish itself from suicide such 
that it avoids carrying the same associations of shame, despair, and tragedy.  






and inevitable, with the intention to reduce suffering associated with many end-stage terminal 
illnesses. The right to die is one of the most compelling arguments for the expanded legalization 
of PAD, as “it draws on the principle of autonomy, which is highly valued in a democracy” 
(Tomlinson, Spector, Nurock, & Stott, 2015, p. 724). The reduction of suffering is focused 
primarily upon physical suffering, as many states in the US require an evaluation by a 
psychologist to rule out psychological drivers behind the wish to end one’s life with PAD, and 
the presence of depressive and certain other psychological disorders can disqualify potential 
candidates of PAD. This distinction between physiological and psychological drivers of the wish 
to end one’s life is a particularly fraught element of the cultural debates over the legality of PAD, 
as some have argued for the legality of PAD for psychiatric illnesses including treatment-
resistant depression, which is legal (although rarely approved) in the Netherlands and Belgium 
(Steinbock, 2017). The Netherlands is also the only country in which PAD is a legal option for 
people with Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias (D. Jones, Gastmans, & MacKellar, 2017). 
Alzheimer’s disease is in an odd middle ground with regards to the split between physiological 
and psychological disorders driving the decision to end one’s life before the disease does. Unlike 
psychiatric illnesses, Alzheimer’s disease is a terminal illness that has a clear biological etiology; 
however, its primary symptoms are in the domains most often claimed by psychology: cognition, 
behavior, and social relationships.  
Ecological Developmental Model of PAD 
Urie Bronfenbrenner originally published The Ecology of Human Development in 1981, 
which has since been widely influential, including being significantly taken up in the 2017 APA 
multicultural guidelines (American Psychological Association, 2017). His dynamic, bidirectional 






human experience is left out of most accounts of developmental psychology (especially coming 
from a Piagetian model), and that furthermore, context is complex and dynamic, and should be 
conceptually broken down into several interacting levels to better see its nuance. Bronfenbrenner 
wrote, “The ecological environment is conceived as extending far beyond the immediate 
situation directly affecting the developing person” (1981, p. 7), giving a wider lens of analysis 
for understanding individual experience. His model includes several levels that are like 
concentric rings around the individual, that extend from internal experience of an individual 
through many layers of relational contexts from immediate family to community, institutions, 
sociopolitical systems, cultural ideologies, and global environments. 
This ecological model of development allows us to see a more dynamic picture of how 
PAD may be taken up in an individual’s life. As Susan Wolf put it in her feminist analysis of the 
issue, “the debate over whether to legitimate physician-assisted suicide is most often about a 
patient who does not exist – a patient with no gender, race, or insurance status” (1996, p. 282). 
By using an ecological approach to understanding context and identity, we can better understand 
how PAD might impact real people situated in their specific sociocultural context. Furthermore, 
we can get a better understanding of the ways in which PAD does not exist merely as an 
individual choice, but impacts the individual through multiple contextual layers. Cheryl Mwaria 
(1997) urged people to consider the impact of culture on the debate about expanding legal access 
to physician assisted suicide. She argued that in considering physician-assisted suicide, “the real 
challenge lies in understanding the nature of culture itself. By definition, culture is learned 
behavior pertaining to norms for what is considered proper, moral or even sane; as well as 
values, customs, beliefs and artifacts that comprise the knowledge and technology by which we 






sometimes unconscious impact of broader contextual factors on an individual’s choice to end 
their life with PAD. She cautioned, “What seems on the surface to be a voluntary act, the rational 
decision to end one's life, may actually be the product of social expectations” (p. 862).  
Considering social power dynamics, systems of medical care, governmental structures 
that impact caregiving and access to care such as Medicaid and managed care, the “right to die” 
argument becomes more complicated, and it becomes complicated in unique ways for people 
with Alzheimer’s disease. An international systemic review of the literature on attitudes toward 
PAD for people with dementia found that “sociodemographic factors influence attitudes toward 
assisted dying,” including factors like age, ethnicity, gender and religion (Tomlinson & Stott, 
2015, p. 10). Arguments about the impact of culture and other layers of the ecological model of 
development help us pay attention to things like how gender roles might impact the level of 
comfort a person might feel in depending on others for care. This example remains relevant for 
people with Alzheimer’s disease, however there are additional and unique layers to consider with 
regards to PAD being used by people with Alzheimer’s and other dementias.  
Arguments that this dissertation has already reviewed about the debate on selfhood in 
people with Alzheimer’s disease are particularly relevant. Although I argued in the literature 
review section of this dissertation that people with Alzheimer’s disease have an ongoing 
embodied selfhood, there is no doubt that there are major changes in the self that occur over the 
course of the disease. Indeed, that there is a debate about whether or not the self persists 
throughout the course of the disease is an important cultural factor in considering the 
unconscious ways in which people with Alzheimer’s disease may be influenced in deciding 
whether or not to use PAD were it legal. The fact that Alzheimer’s disease itself is often 






potentially influence a person to feel that they would avoid profound suffering if they could die 
before the disease runs its full course. In other words, part of the suffering experienced by people 
with Alzheimer’s disease includes being socially devalued, which can be understood as “excess 
disability,” a concept I discussed in the literature review of this dissertation, which articulates the 
“discrepancy that exists when a person’s functional incapacity is greater than that warranted by 
the actual impairment” (Brody et al., 1971, p. 124). Insofar as this aspect of suffering might 
influence a person with Alzheimer’s disease to want to use PAD, a more ethical intervention than 
PAD would be an intervention on a cultural level to reduce stigma and increase a value of 
neurodiverse people, including people with Alzheimer’s disease. Of course, this is not the only 
element of suffering that people with Alzheimer’s disease experience, however it is an important 
cultural consideration of the use of PAD with people who have Alzheimer’s. 
The same systemic review mentioned above found that issues of capacity and dementia 
severity are important considerations, and that people with dementia and their caregivers “held 
reservations about euthanasia in advanced dementia and were instead supportive of PAS 
[Physician-Assisted Suicide] in the early stages of dementia” (Tomlinson & Stott, 2015, p. 17). 
Being able to participate in informed consent can become impossible in the late stages of the 
disease despite the presence of a persistent embodied selfhood in people with Alzheimer’s 
disease. It comes down, once again, to the issue of timing: while people in the early stages of 
Alzheimer’s can participate in informed consent, at that point they are too far from death to be 
eligible to legally use PAD. However, even people in the early stages of the disease are 
vulnerable to social pressures that can influence one’s autonomy in consenting to PAD. The 
negative stigma of simply having Alzheimer’s disease is likely to exert a degree of pressure that 






This raises questions about how we structure legal access to PAD. Why is it that 6 
months is the legal window within which one can use PAD in the US? Might people with 
Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias deserve to have access to PAD earlier should they wish 
to use it? The intent of this chapter is not to advocate one way or the other for expanding legal 
access to PAD to people with Alzheimer’s disease, but rather to explore the complexity of the 
issue and situate the debate within broader cultural considerations. Personally, I feel uncertain 
about my stance on this issue even after further research. While it was clear that my Mom wished 
in her earlier years to die before she had advanced Alzheimer’s disease, this dissertation 
demonstrates the value and gifts that she offered to the world even while she was in the advanced 
stages of the disease. And by the time she was later into the disease, it did not at all seem clear 
that she would have rather not been alive for her final years. My Mom’s experience, however, is 
not indicative or prescriptive of the experience of others living with Alzheimer’s disease or other 
dementias, and is highly influenced by her specific cultural situatedness as a white woman who 
thrived in our hypercognitive culture, who identified as a caregiver through her roles as a mother 
and daughter, and who witnessed her own mother’s decline and eventual death from Alzheimer’s 
disease within our system of managed medical care. 
What is clear through this exploration is that the medical industrial complex, interwoven 
as it is with our legal system, highly regulates who can access what type of care, when they can 
access it, and what counts as qualifying for access, often without consideration for cultural 
situatedness and the implicit pressure people may experience based on their socialization within 
certain culturally delineated roles such as gender, race, or disability status. Although this chapter 
focuses specifically on the legal and medical structures in the United States, there are insights 






that motivate arguments on either side of the debate about PAD. That the medical industrial 
complex has such a degree of influence and power over our choices about living and dying is 
itself a symptom of the Anthropocene. Whether it is good or bad, something people should have 
control to hasten or delay, when and how it is better to seek death than to seek ongoing life, and 
how to navigate issues of consent and representation for beings who cannot advocate for 
themselves within our current social structures are all relevant debates, and the answers are 
complex and perhaps can never be settled entirely. Expanding these debates onto the level of the 
human species and our interdependence with an animate biosphere, is relevant to this moment of 
existential crisis in the Anthropocene. Roy Scranton wrote, “it may be that we have crossed the 
summit of our knowledge and power, and the brief explosion of human life in the Holocene will 
turn out to have been as transient as an algae bloom. It may be, on the other hand, that we’ll find 
a way to survive in the Anthropocene, perhaps even find ways to maintain human civilization in 
some recognizable form” (Scranton, 2015, p. 118). As we make choices about whether and how 
we collectively live and die in the Anthropocene, we must represent the other-than-human beings 
who cannot self-advocate within our social structures. Navigating the complex ethics of these 








Chapter 7: Time Traveling 
When my Mom stopped eating for 4 days in February 2019, the owner of the assisted 
living facility into which we had moved her only a month prior suggested it was time to get 
hospice services for her. Although she had been engaged in profound transformation for years 
already, I was not ready for this suggestion, and suddenly I was forced to consider just how 
immanent her death could be.  
I did not want my Mom to die! I felt confused, devastated, and scared. And then a wave 
washed over me: awe. She is twisting the folds of the skin between this world and the spirit 
world. Twisting it toward an opening for her passage. It felt so much like a birth - something 
within her set in motion this process, and everything in her lifeworld was contracting, making 
space, allowing, saying “yes,” breathing with and for her. A movement that was bigger-than was 
casting us all to our knees, rhythmically sighing, crying, breathing with and for her. Moving her 
spirit through us. Letting go where we could, though parts of us rebelled and pleaded for more 
time. Parts of us remembered the softness of her skin and wonder whether they’ll ever touch 
anything so soft again. A softness our hearts could touch. A softness we shepherd through the 
movement. 
My Mom died on April 20, 2019. My Dad was with her, holding her hand, and I was at 
home in Pittsburgh, my brother at his home in Portland, OR. There was something that felt 
removed from time when she died. That night, it felt so unreal to learn of her death in my 
bedroom around midnight, as if news like that should only be delivered in special places away 
from everyday life. My grief about my Mom had been with me for years already, a blend of 
anticipatory grief and an ongoing series of losses with the transformation of our relationship as 






normal life, although the journey to this point had been very difficult already. In recent years, my 
grief had been coming out sideways; often when I felt unrestrained joy, I would begin crying, the 
grief having found an escape hatch. I tried to let myself grieve in intentional doses, but I had a 
filter. I felt I needed a filter to carry on with my own life over those years, like a dam that 
regulated the flow of a river.  
When she died, the dam broke.  
For weeks after her death, I was inundated with vivid memories of being with her 
throughout my lifetime. I did not try to remember these things; rather, I felt as if I were simply a 
conduit, and my grief had its own intentionality, flowing through me with force. I found myself 
in my parent’s bed again as a young child, giggling together with my Mom as we cuddled on a 
weekend morning, the sheets illuminated by sunlight streaming through the window, the smell of 
waffles and bacon drifting up from the kitchen downstairs where my dad cooked breakfast, still 
in his fleece bathrobe. Joy. I found myself storming up the stairs in high school away from a 
fight with my Mom, and after a few minutes, her following me to make peace about whatever it 
was we were fighting about. These and hundreds, maybe thousands of other memories were 
more vivid than anything happening around me, flowing from one to the next. My grief made the 
world I was actually in feel colorless, and my body felt like it weighed a thousand pounds in 
those weeks. But in the flood of memories there was life and levity, and I time travelled from 
memory to memory, an orangutan in the jungle of my Mom, my world-maker. A whole 
ecosystem of memories to dwell in. 
My Mom had taught me during her time with Alzheimer’s about time travel. At first, I 
found it scary, being shuttled with her into her memories of her parents, who she often thought 






school, needing to prepare for an exam, and the next we would be in her adulthood when she was 
caregiving for her own mother, who had died some 20 years prior. Being in conversation with 
her meant you had to be ready to time travel at any moment. It required a receptiveness beyond 
the frame of my own perception and flexibility in one of our most basic forms of being oriented 
to the world: knowing where you are in time and space.  
At first, I felt rigid and resistant to time traveling with her. I remember having a dream 
about it in 2017. My journal from the time wrote: “I dreamt I went through the portal, down 
through some kind of webbing, below. Landing in Disneyland after dark, but not the way it is 
marketed. It is disorienting like a state fair after too many rollercoaster rides, clownish music 
distorting, childhood imagery suddenly frightening. I’m with my Mom, and I’m searching for her 
at the same time.” It was so disorienting to time travel with my Mom; to meet her where she was 
at, wherever and whenever she was at from her point of view. I felt as if I might lose my own 
grip on the present, and on my sanity, in the process of trying to join with her.  
Over time I became more comfortable time traveling with her. I’m not sure if I got used 
to it, or if it just started to feel less scary. Wrapped up into the time traveling was an engagement 
with my grief: my sadness, anger, confusion, and simple resistance to the fact that my Mom had 
Alzheimer’s. To join with her was to allow all those things into my experience. To be present 
with her required being present with my grief. Time traveling with my Mom meant that things 
were not how they used to be between us. 
I don’t remember how many days passed between when my Mom died and when I flew 
to Tucson with my partner Kyle to be with my family. I do remember feeling completely useless 
though. My friend Autumn Marie came over to help me pack my suitcase. Kyle sat in the middle 






other people, receiving the in-flight snacks for me. I remember thinking about all the other 
bereaved people who fly every day after receiving shocking news of a loved one’s death. I felt a 
solidarity with this fragile, invisible community. 
 Within a week following my Mom’s death, my family had a viewing so we could say 
goodbye to her body before she was cremated. We planned for a larger celebration of life a 
couple months later, so the viewing was just my Dad, my brother, my brother’s partner Lisa, 
Kyle, and my Mom’s cousin David. Saying goodbye to my Mom… there was an impossibility of 
that day. My Mom, the creator of my lifeworld. I can’t describe that experience with many 
words, nor do I want to let my readers into the full depth of that memory; it is mine to keep. 
However, at her viewing I cried with a wide open heart, no holding back. My Mom’s cousin 
David commented that it was as if each gasping breath I took as I sobbed was as if I were 
breathing in another memory, each breath out, giving another memory to her. My Mom taught 
me how to time travel when she had Alzheimer’s, which ended up helping me survive her death. 
I trusted that I could give myself over to that journey through time with the surge of memories 
flowing through me. 
Grief: Ontological Liminality 
Grief is a cellular matter. […] One lives a kind of cocoon existence: the world 
fades and the body shrinks into the space of its grieving. 
– Robert Romanyshyn, 2002, p.55 
 
Grief animates this project, which I began before my Mom died. In a way, this project is 
an anatomy of grief. A map of my grief for me to find myself in, because I spent so much time 
lost. Lost in the fog of confusion, right there with my Mom. The mother I knew was changing, 






caregiver for my Mom, I grieved the parent-child relationship I was used to. I was privileged to 
grow up with a Mom I could rely on to take care of me. As her disease progressed, I lost the 
mom who could take care of me and gained a mom who I could take care of.  
What is the grieving process like when losing someone to Alzheimer’s? Although 
depression and stress in caregivers of people with Alzheimer’s has been widely researched 
(Schulz et al., 2003), caregiver grief has gained relatively little focus (Large & Slinger, 2015). It 
has been suggested that caregiver grief has often been misdiagnosed as depression, especially the 
phenomenon of anticipatory grief (Walker & Pomeroy, 1996). Grief is a relational phenomenon. 
What is unique about grief associated with losing someone from Alzheimer’s? 
Anticipatory grief is a kind of grief that is experienced when anticipating losses. It is 
typically an experience that motivates discussions about dying and addressing any problems in 
interpersonal relationships with the person dying (Rando, 2000). When losing somebody to 
Alzheimer’s, anticipatory grief is the anticipation of further decline and eventual death. Unlike 
with many other forms of illness, anticipatory grief in this context often occurs simultaneously 
with another form of grief: ambiguous loss. 
Ambiguous loss refers to experiencing ambiguity of absence and presence, and is a 
defining experience among people who love somebody with Alzheimer’s disease where the 
person is physically present but experiences profound psychosocial changes (Boss, 2009). 
Pauline Boss (2009) wrote, “Ambiguous loss is the most stressful loss people can face” (Boss, 
2009, p. 20). Marwit and Meuser (2005) argued that the grief of caregivers of individuals with 
dementia is ‘‘more akin to true grief [post-death grief] than it is to the anticipatory grief 
experienced by caregivers of patients with other terminal illness’’ (p. 202). Ambiguous loss can 






for example by reorganizing roles in the family system. Blandin and Pepin (2017) expanded on 
this by acknowledging the compounded serial losses with the progression of the disease. 
Furthermore, Boss articulated that “people are denied symbolic rituals that ordinarily support a 
clear loss” (2009, p. 7), resulting in an isolated and unvalidated experience for many people 
going through an ambiguous loss. Finally, because ambiguous losses typically last for an 
indefinite, ongoing period of time, it causes emotional exhaustion from the relentless uncertainty 
(Boss, 2009, pp. 7-8).  
The experience of ambiguous loss has gained more focus in the literature than post-death 
grief in loved ones of somebody with Alzheimer’s disease due to its unique and defining nature. 
Caregivers experience a magnitude of stress preceding physical death considered equal to or 
greater than the stress in bereavement after physical death (Noyes et al., 2010). Ambiguous loss 
creates significant distress before the death of the loved one with Alzheimer’s, and because it is 
largely unrecognized and even stigmatized, it warrants the attention it has gotten in research. I 
aim to describe here a more in-depth account of the lived experience of ambiguous loss and the 
effect it has on post-death grief when losing a loved one to Alzheimer’s. 
Liminality 
Blandin and Pepin (2017) offer the concept of liminality to describe the experience of 
pre-death grief of a loved one with Alzheimer’s:  
Liminality is the state of being in-between a previous situation and an emerging situation. 
Liminal is derived from the Latin word limen, which means threshold. In crossing a 
threshold, there is movement from one place or state to another; when one stands in the 
threshold, however, one is betwixt and between both. (p. 73)  






phenomenological understanding of ambiguous grief. 
This description resonates with my experience of grief before my Mom died. It felt as if 
the level of stress and grief I felt while my Mom was living with Alzheimer’s had no place to go 
or be recognized. While life outside my family carried on with its usual high-speed clip, for the 
majority of the time my Mom had Alzheimer’s she thought of me as still being a college student. 
I was in multiple timescapes simultaneously. Although I was young when she was sick – in my 
late 20s – I felt trapped in her perception as being in an earlier developmental stage, further 
complicating my family’s ability to reorganize our roles. My social experience of time was either 
stuck too far in the past or moving too quickly toward the future to make room for the slow-
moving elephant that was my grief. I was time-travelling every day, held between my grief and 
my obligations to my PhD program as a psychologist in training.  
Liminality in the grief of loving someone with Alzheimer’s touches identity, time, and 
community, and is a crucial concept in understanding what I experienced as a form of time 
traveling. Blandin and Pepin offer the concept of liminality to describe the ambiguous pre-death 
grief, because of the ongoing losses paired with ongoing presence of the person with 
Alzheimer’s. However, I wish to expand this description of liminality beyond the feelings 
provoked by the ambiguous presence and absence of the person with Alzheimer’s, or the 
ambiguous presence and absence after the death of someone with Alzheimer’s. Liminality 
describes an ontological experience in this grief. Existential phenomenology can help form a 
deeper description of this. 
From an existential phenomenological perspective, human existence cannot be separated 
from the world in which we dwell. “Dasein” is a term that the philosopher Martin Heidegger 






“existence” (Heidegger, 1962). The importance of this term is that it refuses to disentangle being 
from its context, and captures the fact that people are permeable with their environment, 
histories, and relationships as “being-in-the-world.” Erik Craig describes being-in-the-world 
eloquently: “I don’t experience my existence as stopping here with my flesh but, rather, as 
extending outward, and outward, and outward, in space, time, and relation” (2008, p. 242). 
Being-in-the-world is a term that is hyphenated because it indicates the utterly inseparable nature 
of Being from the context within which one exists. In other words, not only do we not exist in a 
vacuum, we could not exist in a vacuum. Rather, we exist because of, and out in, the world. 
Erik Craig provides a beautiful example of what this term can contribute to our 
understanding of grief:  
If we do exist, fundamentally, as in-the-world, as-world, then others, especially 
significant others, actually comprise our existence, to a mighty degree are our 
existence. […] When a person loses a parent, or child, or partner, or dear friend to 
death, it is a significant feature of that individual’s very own existence and 
identity within it that dies. (2008, p. 247) 
Our in-the-world nature means that we inhabit shared lifeworlds with the people and 
other beings and places with whom we are in relation. When somebody who sculpts part of our 
lifeworld dies, our lifeworld itself is altered. The part of our lifeworld we shared with that other 
closes off. “This expansion and mutual overlap of selves may be regarded as the most essential 
presupposition of grief. For it means that the other is present for me both as other, as the real 
person, and as the “other-of-myself,” as part of my self-experience” (Fuchs, 2018, p. 49). Being 
in relationship entails an overlapping, a joining of lifeworlds. Our relational nature is not simply 






constituted by others. This implies a deep relationality—an intercorporeality—a permeability 
with other beings. We are permeable not only to other beings, but also to places, things, cultures, 
and histories. Our skin is a permeable threshold, our being emanates beyond the periphery of the 
skin, and the world lives as much outside us as it does inside us. 
Being-with others is something that takes place in time, and it is worth here exploring the 
role of temporality in grief. Intercorporeality with loved ones that I mentioned above also implies 
a “contemporality” with others: “from early childhood on, intersubjective synchronicity is 
constituted through the presence of others and through our shared reference to the world, as in 
joint attention or joint action” (Fuchs, 2018, p. 50). Pre-reflexive understanding of one’s location 
in time, or lived time, is in part constituted by being in relation to other beings in time. This is 
what Minkowski (1970, p. 65) refers to as “lived synchronism,” that is, a kind of vital contact 
with or harmonious immersion in the flow of the world around us. Loved ones constitute a large 
portion of our sense of being-in-the-world. This anchoring into contemporality with other beings 
begins in infancy, with the attunement between baby and caregiver through responsive touch, 
gaze, facial expressions and tone of voice (Wallin, 2007, p. 293). Anchoring into relationship 
with caregivers is also a way of anchoring into a rhythmic time that expands beyond the simple 
internal rhythms of breath and heartbeat.  
Relationships with caregivers expand the horizon of lived time. The experience of time is 
deeply influenced by the relationship one has with one’s earliest attachment figures. Fuchs 
wrote, “present time, or the’ now’, always means the actual, imagined or at least implicit 
presence of others with whom we, in principle at least, co-experience the world” (2018, p. 50). 
This endures throughout the lifespan, though perhaps in a decreasingly conscious manner. When 






emerges. One’s immersion in the flow of time that is established in part through the presence, 
real and imagined, of the primary attachment figure meets a fork in the road: time, of course, 
continues flowing, but the horizon of the lifeworld extended by the primary attachment figure 
stops in its tracks. Fuchs continued: “The temporality of grief may be described as a separation 
of two forms of time, one flowing, one arrested, which become more and more desynchronized” 
(2018, p. 50).  
Already a sort of time traveling happens inadvertently, between the ongoing flow of the 
present and this arrested past in which the loved one was still alive. It is not uncommon for 
people to describe early grief as if they are barely present in the ongoing flow of time; their 
bodies feel heavy, their thoughts sluggish and unable to make simple decisions. Their awareness 
and attunement are mostly elsewhere in time, in the past with their loved one. This kind of time 
travel is not graceful.  
Although I, too, experienced this sluggishness, I believe my contemporality with a loved 
one who had Alzheimer’s disease taught me how to time travel before my Mom’s death. There 
were two major ways in which my Mom taught me to be comfortable with time travel before 
being thrown into the time travel inherent in grief. One, of course, was the time travel involved 
in attuning to and joining with her lifeworld, which involved significant and sometimes rapid 
time travel between different periods of time in her own life. Second was the flip-side of the 
same coin: the intermittent departure from the flow of my situatedness in the broader 
sociocultural here and now. Being-with her meant being-away from my immediate surrounds, 
disengaging from my own ground. My Mom taught me about liminality while she was alive, 
which made the liminal nature of grieving her death easier to navigate, almost literally. I did not 






Mariana Ortega, a Latina feminist phenomenologist, wrote that “Heidegger discusses the 
importance of Dasein being a historical being that interprets itself in specific environments, but 
he does not describe or engage with those environments” (2016, p. 56). Ortega’s important 
contribution to phenomenology focuses on sociocultural situatedness, and her attention to the 
specificity of the “world” of being-in-the-world is helpful in understanding the liminality I 
became oriented within while my Mom had Alzheimer’s. Ortega describes the being in a 
multiplicity of particular histories, using the example of Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La 
Frontera(1999), in which Anzaldúa describes the international borderlands between the U.S. and 
Mexico. Ortega documents the multiplicities and in-betweenness of living under multiple 
conflicting sociopolitical histories simultaneously. Ortega proposes an “in-between, 
multiplicitous selfhood,” which has a condition of “liminality” and involves inhabiting “more 
than one world” and travelling constantly across worlds (2016, pp. 64-65). Ortega offers an 
understanding that the self is transformed by being in more than one world, and that liminality is 
not just a condition out there in the world, but one that becomes fundamental to the experience of 
being.  
Ortega (2016) wrote that Latina feminist phenomenology underscores the ontic—the 
material conditions of being human—focusing especially on the “particular power relations 
informing specific economic, cultural, and societal ‘theres’” (p. 53). Those particular power-
laden “theres” into which we are thrown (the ‘da’ of dasein) are complex, and impact things like 
mood, language, how we move through space, how we conceive of and experience time, and 
other existentalia. She articulates this as an integration of the ontic and the ontological – being 
liminal is an ontological trait, but it appears because of the world-traveling of belonging in 






discussion of liminality in the grief of losing a loved one to Alzheimer’s. It also offers an 
understanding where the material conditions of the Anthropocene influence the ontological 
conditions of being-in-the-world. 
The fact that Western societies tend to conceive of time as linear and bereavement as a 
minor interruption in productivity creates resistance to the multiplicitous experience of time, one 
that is internalized by people acculturated in these ideas. Of course, there are power dynamics 
behind this which animate subjectivity during the Anthropocene: a linear understanding of time 
is important to the economic system of capitalism, and limiting the time and space in which grief 
can be experienced keeps the engines of capital churning and diminishes resistance to the 
economic powers that spread unprecedented destruction through the natural world. Much like I 
tell my clients who experience depression that psychic numbing is a blunt instrument, one that 
tends to numb not only pain but also joy, something similar can be said of grief. Having time and 
space to fall apart in grief, to time travel in grief, puts the many ungrieved griefs of the past into 
reach. When you really let yourself go into the river of grief, the losses of our contemporary 
world shaped in the Anthropocene can come into sharp relief as well. Becoming oriented in the 
liminality of chronic grief is an important skill for being and dying in the Anthropocene, one 
which our most forgetful elders are skilled in helping us learn. 
Liminality therefore is not simply a metaphor to describe the ambiguous presence and 
absence of a dying loved one. Liminality is an ontological experience of the griever, one that 
stretches being-in-time such that one experiences not simply being in the present or the past, but 
being in the present and the past simultaneously; it is a multiplicitous selfhood. Simms explains: 
“From the beginning, perception is never neutral but shot through with memory and desire: 






italics in the original). When loving somebody with Alzheimer’s, the time travel required to join 
with the person in their present understanding of reality builds a certain skill, fortitude, and even 
mastery, like learning to ride a bike, in being in multiple worlds.  
It is not uncommon to hear of people feeling relieved when a loved one dies from 
Alzheimer’s (Doka, 2004), because the painful ambiguous grief that can last for years, and 
finally that ambiguous grief becomes—well, not ambiguous anymore. In my own experience, I 
would describe this differently. Compared with other deaths I have experienced, I felt well 
prepared to be in the liminality of grief, and so there was an ease in the grief after my Mom died. 
Not to mention, there was a shift in the social recognition and support I gained in the immediate 
aftermath of my Mom’s death, which allowed me to further let go into my grief without trying to 
stay grounded in the here-and-now. Navigating the torrent of memories surging through me in 
the weeks after my Mom died felt like something I was already skilled in doing, which meant I 
did not need to resist the powerfully disorienting process of my own time travel. I could just let 
the memories come; I could trust that journey. Indeed, I could take refuge in my memories of my 
Mom; I let myself feel the reality of those memories not as a past which was irrevocably severed 
from the present, but as a place I visited through time travel that was just as real as anything else. 
I didn’t look at the memories from the outside, but rather entered into them fully. This was the 
gift my Mom gave me, what she taught me in her own time travel while she had Alzheimer’s. 
Losing her made me want her comfort more than anyone else’s, and I was able to really receive 







Chapter 8: Discussion 
Through autoethnographic, phenomenological and critical theoretical methods, this 
dissertation elaborated my relational connection to my Mom in the context of our cultural 
situatedness. I used evocative vignettes to trace my memories of being with my Mom while she 
had Alzheimer’s disease. I then analyzed each vignette to connect my experience with wider 
cultural, political and historical meanings and phenomena to understand how our relational 
connection was permeated by and situated within a broader context. Through each vignette and 
its connected analysis, themes and implications emerged that supported the primary question of 
this dissertation: what can people with Alzheimer’s disease can teach us about being, forgetting, 
and dying in the Anthropocene, an era of deep, collective forgetfulness about our 
interconnectedness with human and non-human beings? This chapter will briefly summarize the 
findings and questions explored in this dissertation, implications of the findings, limitations of 
the project, and directions for further inquiry. 
Summary of Findings 
The basic research prompts of this project were “what was my relationship with my Mom 
like while she had Alzheimer’s disease?” and “how was our experience situated in broader 
sociocultural and historical contexts?” These questions aimed to describe and elaborate on the 
phenomenon in order to better understand what happened, and to share my stories of being with 
my Mom as a narrative offering of the complexities and gifts of loving someone with 
Alzheimer’s disease. These prompts generated the stories which became the data that I used to 
address my overarching research question, “what can people with Alzheimer’s disease teach us 






about our interconnectedness with human and non-human beings?” This question aims to 
synthesize the answers to the previous questions and offer a more generalizable take away from 
my experiences. This question also intends to challenge dominant discourses around a deficit 
model of understanding Alzheimer’s disease by asking what wisdom people with Alzheimer’s 
disease can offer humanity in the face of our collective existential crisis related to climate 
change.  
I told many stories in this dissertation. I shared my pain about Alzheimer’s disease being 
the elephant in the room as my Mom denied having it. I observed how objects of her lifeworld 
became things again, de-objectified as her cognition changed over the course of the disease. I 
shared unexpected gifts my Mom gave me, including introducing me to ancestors who I didn’t 
know were there. I described a shape-shifting landscape and how my Mom would self-locate 
based on her emotional stirrings and memories of belonging in other landscapes. I shared the 
dilemma my family faced as my Mom’s health went downhill, and questions emerged of how 
best to care for her on the spectrum between prolonging her life and using physician-assisted 
dying. Finally, I shared the story of when my Mom died, and the skills she gave me in time 
traveling, which became a refuge in my grief.  
Each of these stories was followed by a section of critical analysis, which elicited themes 
and connected my stories to broader psychological, sociocultural and philosophical phenomena 
and ideas. I analyzed the role of denial in psychological and sociocultural contexts, drawing a 
connection with the denial we see about the era of the Anthropocene. I explored the 
phenomenology of things, and the animacy of the unobjectified world around us. I discussed co-
existentiality and intersubjectivity as ontological dimensions of experience. I explored dwelling 






examined physician assisted dying as an artifact of Western allopathic medicine and situated it 
within an ecological-developmental context of human experience. Finally, I explored the 
ontology of liminality as a defining framework for the experience of ambiguous grief in losing a 
loved one to Alzheimer’s disease.   
This project traveled in many directions and integrated theoretical perspectives from 
multiple disciplines. Thematic threads that persisted throughout the project included the 
examination of selfhood and the Western, and specifically American, cultural values that limit 
our understandings of selfhood as being especially defined by cognition. I advanced stories and 
arguments that see people with Alzheimer’s disease as having an ongoing selfhood that 
continues to contribute important, unique, and unreplaceable perspectives to their communities. 
Another core theme was an examination of how our understandings of selfhood influence what 
we consider to be “care.” I advanced arguments about co-existentiality and interdependence that 
expand the scope of care. Through this project, I contributed to the development of a more robust 
understanding of being in relation to loved ones who have Alzheimer’s disease, to offer language 
to the experiences of intersubjectivity that can deeply alter our own perception of what it means 
to navigate death and life, remembering and forgetting, in a Western neoliberal cultural context.  
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to explore what it was like to share a 
relational world with my Mom while she lived with Alzheimer’s disease that is responsive to the 
sociopolitical and historical dynamics of living in the Anthropocene, and to articulate the unique 
perspectives my Mom’s forgetfulness could offer about how to live in a deeply forgetful era. I 
wanted my readers to feel in their bodies the rhythms of remembering, the textures of lifeworlds 
and temporal horizons shuffling. I intended for my readers to question what they have forgotten, 






to enter by our forgetful elders.  
Implications 
Our treatment of people with Alzheimer’s disease speaks of who and what we are, 
and so the tangled veil is truly a mirror. 
– Steven Sabat (2001, p. 340). 
 
This dissertation offers findings specific to my relationship with my Mom while she had 
Alzheimer’s, as well as implications that are generalizable beyond her and I. Importantly this 
dissertation advanced an exploration about subjectivity that expands Western understandings of 
intersubjectivity and cognition, and locates subjectivity within particular cultural contexts and 
fields of embodiment that extend beyond the periphery of the skin. How our culture thinks about 
and treats people with Alzheimer’s is of philosophical and political significance. It has the 
potential to reveal our culture’s ontological values and how those values promote alienation from 
the earth, from things, and from each other, and how people with Alzheimer’s can teach us 
another way of being woven into our collective lifeworld.  
The question that I aim to address in the implications section is: What can our most 
forgetful elders teach us about being, forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene, an era of deep, 
collective forgetfulness about our interconnectedness with human and non-human beings? By 
synthesizing the previous chapters I aim in this section to attempt an answer, or at least a partial 
answer, to this question. This is a question about wisdom, about the specific perspective and 
knowledge that people with Alzheimer’s have. It is a question that aims not only to find some 
real answers, but that by asking it is also intended to help my readers resist the pathology 
paradigm, which looks at people with Alzheimer’s from a deficit perspective. I intend for this 






with Alzheimer’s. Wisdom, an offering of perspective gained from experience. Although these 
themes are not exhaustive, they are the ones that most resonated with me and which most 
directly related to the data gathered and analyzed in previous sections of this dissertation.  
Denial is part of the journey, and it needs to be worked through.  
Denial is a life-saving defense mechanism that helps protect us from catastrophic anxiety. 
Denial is about anticipating psychic annihilation. Climate chaos brought on by the Anthropocene 
can, and probably should, trigger catastrophic anxiety; it is, after all, an existential threat. Denial 
about climate chaos is commonplace. It is not just in politicians and oil tycoons, and your 
difficult uncle you only see at holiday dinners. Denial is in you. Denial is in me. Denial is a 
curious squirrel who keeps coming back for more, who has learned that there will continue to be 
more and more scraps to forage as we uncover ever more about the crisis of the Anthropocene. 
Denial is best handled with compassion, reflection, generous resonance, and loving curiosity 
about the underlying anxiety. Accountability is the goal, but to create movement with denial, 
attend to the affect rather than the thought content. Catastrophic anxiety is decreased when we 
don’t feel alone in it. Lean into connection, offer connection, when you notice denial. It takes 
tremendous courage to look at the Anthropocene, and we can’t do it alone. Getting into 
connection might itself require accountability, as the same systems that have created the 
Anthropocene—capitalism and colonialism—also have created systemic social injustices which 
create and maintain chronic disconnection. We have our work cut out for us. 
Listen for the animacy of things and other beings.  
There is a lot more animacy around us than we have been trained to perceive as people 
socialized in American culture, steeped as it is in economics of exchange value and 






intention and the world of things. Another way of saying friction is relation. There is again a 
chronic disconnection–a species loneliness–that comes from our reliance on objectification and, 
ironically, the culture we live in practically demands constant objectification in order to belong. 
Robin Wall Kimmerer described species loneliness as “a deep, unnamed sadness stemming from 
estrangement from the rest of Creation, from the loss of relationship. As our dominance of the 
world has grown, we have become more isolated, more lonely when we can no longer call out to 
our neighbors” (Kimmerer, 2013, p. 208). My Mom experienced a decline of the ability to 
objectify things; examples I gave in this dissertation included her use of utensils and her way of 
talking about the mountains. Although objectification is not inherently and unequivocally bad, 
taking a receptive, curious stance toward things allows you to perceive the animacy in them. 
When you see from your heart rather than your head, animacy is easier to perceive. Being with 
the animacy of things and other beings is being connected. Feeling this connection with other 
beings – human and other-than-human – is an essential starting place for developing the 
motivation and political will to steer us out of climate chaos.   
You can call upon your ancestors for support and guidance.  
Although the medical model would look at the common experience of people with 
Alzheimer’s disease feeling the presence of their deceased parents or other loved ones as a 
delusion, it looks very different if you remove the lens of the pathology paradigm. My Mom 
sought her parents’ support during an incredible transformation in her life, and they showed up 
for her in her lived experience. Phenomenologically, they were present. When I worked to stay 
close to both her and my own lived experience rather than wed to how I thought the world 
worked, I was surprised to encounter our ancestors as well, an experience I feel uncertain that I 






moment in my own life. Finding my ancestors connected me for the first time with a felt sense of 
an ancestral lineage, with a personal history larger than my own, with a sense of family history 
extending much farther back in time than the two generations that preceded me who I actually 
got to meet. My web of connection, my felt sense of belonging in the world, expanded 
considerably as a result. My Mom showed me that you can call upon your ancestors for support 
and guidance.  
Did you know that you can time travel?  
Learning how to be with somebody with Alzheimer’s requires learning how to become 
comfortable with time travel. Although it felt ontologically disorienting to time travel with 
someone who has Alzheimer’s, it ultimately taught me that time travel opens up past experiences 
as places of refuge, which became a great comfort in my journey with grief after my Mom died. 
Time travelling opens up familiar places from the past within which one can feel a felt sense of 
being at home. Time travel also allows for a longer engagement with what has passed, which is 
an important prerequisite to processes of accountability, justice, and healing. This is something 
that psychotherapists will understand as our field has begun to prize the question of “what 
happened to you?” over the question “what is wrong with you?”. Healing involves looking back 
in time. Time travel is a skill built upon resisting the collective flow of time; departing from the 
cultural norms of how we structure and organize time. Time travel can become a form of 
resistance to the forgetfulness of our era of capitalism, colonialism, consumerism and media 
cycle, which collectively forgets by moving too quickly and linearly into the future to dwell in 
the spiral of history. Slow down. Go back in time. Revisit what has passed. Enter into the past 






Agency in death is difficult to discern. 
The Western medical industrial complex has made possible a particular kind of agency in 
dying through physician assisted death, at least in limited parts of the world. Although great 
consideration and ongoing debate surrounds the legality of this type of death, our individualistic 
society, a result of the main drivers of the Anthropocene – namely capitalism and colonialism – 
has insufficiently addressed interdependence as it relates to agency in dying. Our most forgetful 
elders remind us of our interdependence and complicate considerations of consent and agency, 
especially regarding death. They also highlight that decisions to prolong life are as meaningful 
and complex as decisions to hasten death. Our most forgetful elders remind us about the fluidity 
and permeability of subjectivity, and as such they offer no quick solutions to understanding and 
advocating for agency in death. 
Be a steward of chronic grief.  
Loving somebody with Alzheimer’s disease is a lesson in holding and honoring chronic 
grief. Chronic grief is a characteristic response to ongoing losses, ambiguous losses, and slow-
moving decline. Chronic grief is incredibly painful and can create a feeling of being-between-
worlds, or being liminal. Tending to chronic grief intentionally is necessary to survival; chronic 
grief will make itself known in a million little ways, coming out sideways if it is ignored. How 
can you be a good steward of chronic grief? What I have learned is that the basic ingredients are: 
making containers of time and space for it in your daily and weekly life, seeking connection so 
you have people whose arms you can fall apart into, and engaging in ritual. None of these things 
will make chronic grief go away, but they will all support your survival of it.  
Becoming oriented in chronic grief is an important skill for being and dying in the 






time scale, measured in human life what we are facing is a type of decline that will last through 
our lifetimes, through multiple generations. Good tending of our grief is an important antidote to 
denial, and it is important for transmitting the knowledge we have now to new generations. Even 
stories from my parents’ generation illuminate the slow-moving losses we have faced; simple 
stories about how many fewer bugs there are on the windshield after long drives now than when 
my parents were children. These are the stories that let us know about the change that is taking 
place around us, difficult sometimes to perceive from the shortness of our own lives. Grief will 
come not only about the loss of life we navigate in the sixth mass extinction event now taking 
place (Ceballos et al., 2015), but also how we got here through colonial violence enacted on 
humans and non-humans (Mitchell, 2020). As a settler myself, socialized in a culture which 
values objectification, commodification, exchange value, linear time, and has used genocide, 
slavery, and environmental destruction and exploitation as its building blocks, I grieve my very 
culture. I grieve the way I was taught to be in the world. I lament that this is all normal to me. 
Grieving a chronic, ongoing loss takes fortitude, intention, support and time. Our most forgetful 
elders, each held in social webs of chronic grief, teach us that it is possible to continue engaging 
with the most heart-breaking parts of our lives. They train us in being adept at the liminality of 
chronic grief. And this training, this preparation for transition, this willingness to undergo the 
pain of transformation, is necessary as we face the existential threat of climate chaos brought 
about by the drivers of the Anthropocene. If we are to respond to this threat with any success, we 
must be willing to have our lives transform, we must engage in losses, we must endure grief, for 
generations. Grief will either see us through the social transformations we need to survive this 
threat, or it will serve us through our own ending. Grief is a practice, one our forgetful elders are 







Care is political.  
People with Alzheimer’s need progressively more help from others as the disease 
progresses. The amount of care needed can be staggering, especially for the smaller social 
networks that are typical in American society during late-stage capitalism. The shrinking of 
social networks can be attributed to trends of people moving to different regions for work in a 
globalized economy, as well as to continuing processes of urbanization and gentrification of 
working-class neighborhoods, which fragment local support networks. Smaller care networks 
mean fewer people share the task of caregiving for people with Alzheimer’s disease, which can 
significantly impact caregiver physical and mental health as well as the quality of life for those 
living with Alzheimer’s. This dissertation has focused on themes about the gifts that our most 
forgetful elders give us individually and collectively. This final subsection of the implications 
section focuses on how we care for them, and how our most forgetful elders’ gifts must be 
reciprocated within a framework of collective care. 
Eldercare in general is an oft ignored but urgent area of attention for social justice 
activists and scholars. The state of our systems of care for our elders is inadequate, to put it 
gently. We are now seeing a swelling of the old age population as the baby boomers enter their 
70s, but there has been no matching growth of the services catering to the old. The care services 
that do exist have been globalized, such that a large amount of care-work has shifted to the 
shoulders of immigrant women, who Silvia Federici (2012) reminds us are often undocumented 
and are vulnerable to a great deal of abuse: long hours of work, no paid sick leave or other 
benefits, exposure to racist behavior and sexual assault without adequate legal protections (p. 






homes are what some call the concentration camps of our day: in 2008, for example, the U.S. 
government reported that 94% of our nursing homes have documented histories of abuse, 
neglect, and violations of safety and health standards (Federici, 2012, p. 117). Political 
economists and governments portray provisions that workers have won for their sustenance in 
old age such as pensions and social security as an “economic time bomb” – unsustainable and 
inadequate (Federici, 2012, p. 116). 
Looking at the dire situation of eldercare in the U.S., and in particular for people with 
Alzheimer’s disease who often need high levels of care, we are implored to reinvent our systems 
of care. This is a question of our collective values. It is my hope that this dissertation casts light 
upon the value that people with Alzheimer’s give to our communities and acts as motivation for 
my readers to engage seriously with the issue of how we care for them. It will not be an easy 
problem to solve and will involve demanding a governmental redistribution of wealth and 
investments to provide adequate care for our most forgetful elders. 
Areas for Further Study 
This dissertation offers broad findings in regard to being in relation to people with 
Alzheimer’s disease and contributes to humanistic and phenomenological accounts of the lived 
experience of the disease. In addition to having implications for how we care for people with 
Alzheimer’s disease and understand their ongoing contributions to society, this dissertation led to 
a number of areas for further study. This dissertation has used autoethnographic means to arrive 
at important themes, so the themes are based upon my own lived experience of being in relation 
to my Mom.  This dissertation is therefore very specifically culturally situated not only in the 






in which my Mom and I are located with regards to race, class, gender, ability, and other facets 
of social identity. This dissertation suggests that further study would be fruitful to capture how 
loving somebody with Alzheimer’s might be mediated by these intersections of identity and 
cultural locations by examining the lived experience of people who occupy different positions 
with regards to social privilege and oppression. For example, one of the questions I asked in this 
dissertation was whether people with Alzheimer’s disease who have lived in a single 
geographical area for their whole lives would have similar experiences of locating themselves in 
different places, or whether this phenomenon reflected my Mom’s class privilege of having the 
financial resources to move to different parts of the country during her lifetime. Another fruitful 
area of further study would be to ask the question of what our most forgetful elders can teach us 
about being, forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene – by interviewing people with 
Alzheimer’s disease what their perspective on it is. There would likely be different answers than 
revealed in this project, and the question itself, which is aimed at challenging the stigma 
associated with Alzheimer’s disease, may be therapeutic to the participants who may not have 
previously considered their ongoing contributions to society.  
Practical Applications 
This dissertation suggests a number of practical applications regarding loving and caring 
for somebody with Alzheimer’s disease. There is a general consensus that person-centered care 
for people with Alzheimer’s is recommended, meaning that caregivers are encouraged to go with 
the flow of the person with Alzheimer’s description of their lifeworld. If they talk about being in 
another time or place, it is recommended that caregivers improvise and join with the person’s 






way, without genuine curiosity and attention to what the caregiver might learn from the 
experience. This dissertation suggests that there are important benefits to caregivers from the act 
of joining with their loved ones that can increase the caregiver’s comfort with time travel, a 
supportive factor in the experience of grief.  
Other practical applications include the ways that intersubjectivity and permeability of 
people to their place, relationships, and orientation to things, may influence how we structure 
sites and relationships of caregiving. While there has been interest and attention in some assisted 
living facilities to the architectural and interior design of such structures to facilitate feelings of 
comfort and familiarity, these design considerations are often in tension with economic 
feasibility and are typically reserved for those who have considerable wealth. This dissertation 
emphasizes the importance of place for supporting a sense of safety and belonging for our most 
forgetful elders, and demonstrates that this is an essential need rather than something that should 
be reserved for those with the most economic means.  
This dissertation may also be practically useful for other people who love somebody with 
Alzheimer’s disease to gain insight into their own and their loved one’s experiences. One of the 
very challenging parts of being in the position of loving somebody with Alzheimer’s disease is 
feeling alone and misunderstood by peers who have not had similar experiences. That was 
certainly a part of my own experience, which was perhaps amplified because of my young age 
when I went through this, mostly during my 20s. Even at Alzheimer’s support groups specific to 
adult children of parents with early onset Alzheimer’s disease, I found myself to be younger by 
over a decade than anybody else who attended. My sense of isolation made my grief more 
difficult to carry. Reading literature such as this dissertation, which values personal narrative as 






that help people find the gifts in their forgetful elder’s new ways of being in the world.  
Finally, it is my hope that this dissertation offers practical guidance for our society to 
listen to the unique wisdom that our most forgetful elders can share about being, forgetting and 
dying in the Anthropocene. As we navigate collective issues of denial, transformation, existential 
threat, and grief, our forgetful elders can help us orient to a disorienting world.  
Limitations 
Any research based on a single person’s lived experience, including case studies and 
autoethnographies, has inherent limitations. While these types of studies offer a depth of 
qualitative data that provide valuable insight, it is inherently difficult to make general claims 
from them. This dissertation has attempted to connect my personal narrative with philosophical 
and theoretical chapters that extend the narrative into more generalizable ideas, however they are 
still limited in scope and undoubtedly hold bias from my own cultural situatedness as a white 
able-bodied queer woman with class privilege. Writing autoethnographically into the 
forgetfulness of the Anthropocene was inherently challenging as I attempted to write into my 
own inherited forgetfulness from this era, and write toward another way of being in the world 
that I do not yet fully know how to be. Furthermore, the Anthropocene is such a broad concept 
that it was difficult at times to differentiate whether some aspects of what I wrote about were 
characteristic of the Anthropocene, or perhaps of some smaller or more limited and specific 
cultural phenomenon. 
Further limitations are specific to the lack of representation of my Mom’s voice in this 
dissertation. While the dissertation was specifically focused on my own experiences, I would 






her to see how she perceived these things. Because this project began when she was already in 
the late stage of the disease and the majority of this dissertation was written following her death, 
I did not have the opportunity to do this. This is a significant limitation in verifying the accuracy 
of my perception of her experience, which I tried to mitigate by emphasizing that the data I 
collected was based upon my experience. It is also a limitation in my personal experience of this 
project: I wish I could have shared this with her for the sake of our connection and relationship. 
Although I don’t know whether she would agree with everything that I wrote (in fact, knowing 
my Mom, I am fairly confident she would have opinions about a lot of the things I wrote!), I do 
know that she would be proud of my work and my ongoing dedication to our relationship. When 
she had Alzheimer’s, she thought of me as younger than I was, and typically thought I was in 
college rather than in a PhD program. I know she would be profoundly proud of my decision to 
pursue a PhD in clinical psychology, and of course, the completion of this dissertation indicates 
my completion of my doctoral degree, which she would have been thrilled to celebrate. 
Closing 
This dissertation explored my lived experience of being in relation to my Mom and 
connected this experience with broader sociocultural, psychological, and philosophical 
phenomena and ideas. Above all, this project kept me deeply engaged in relationship with my 
Mom in all parts of my being – heart, head, body, spirit. She has offered me many gifts through 
her time with Alzheimer’s disease, many of which will serve me as I continue to navigate being, 
forgetting and dying in the Anthropocene. Undoubtedly these gifts have and will continue to be 
expressed through me in my clinical work with patients, and I hope that this dissertation 






become newly curious about relating to the forgetful elders in their lives, and to themselves 
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